UNIVERSITY OF UME
Institute of Information
Processing - ADB
|
Postal
address: S-901 87
UME (Sweden) |
Tel
(direct dialing): +46 90
166030 |
Telefax: +46 90
166126(166688) |
Email
(Internet): kivanov@cs.umu.se |
Professor
KRISTO IVANOV
Chair,
Administrative Data Processing
08-11-19
This
is the first step in a research subprogram, and it is cast in the form of a
"reader".
A
proper use of logic in computer and information science requires some knowledge
about the place or function of such logic in the context of inquiry (Churchman,
1971, chap.2). Knowledge about details and requirements of logical
professionalism, whatever "profession" might mean in the context of
human inquiry, implies also an understanding of the present status and use of
the discipline (Copi, 1979; Hamilton, 1978; Mendelson, 1987; Sterling, &
Shapiro, 1986). It implies also a detailed knowledge of its history both as a
discipline as such (Blanch, 1973; Guttenplan, 1986; Kneale, & Kneale,
1965, with a non-philosophical account; Makovelski, 1978; Scholz, 1983;
Stjazkin, 1980), and in its philosophical context (Haack, 1978; Leibniz, 1973;
Mugnai, 1973; Schaff, 1962; Vasa, 1983). Such kind of study should conveniently
be prepared by means of a reading about logic in encyclopedias (see below).
The
main purpose of such an inquiry is to understand: 1) what is legitimate to do with the help or support of
logic, and 2) which are the relations ("interfaces") of logic with
other established areas of knowledge such as language in order to profit of the
insights that have been obtained in particular disciplines. Since linguistics,
as a late Anglo-Saxon expression of earlier philology, often does not seem to
be considered to be an obvious part of philosophy, it may be convenient to
study in greater detail the points of contact between philosophy, logic and
language.(Aarsleff, 1982; Bar-Hillel, 1973, as used by Langefors; Bausani,
1974; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Khnert, 1913; Langefors, 1973; Morris, 1971; Rorty,
1967; Whorf, 1956). Encyclopedias could also be consulted (Bausani, 1974;
International language, 1967; International language, 1973; Universal
languages, 1911). The same kind of study should be dedicated to the contact
between logic and psychology (Doyle, 1982, as an unconscious rebirth of
psychologistic-logicistic issues in today's AI; Feldman, & Toulmin, 1976,
especially considered as a critique of "cognitive science";
Macnamara, 1986; Norstrm, 1912; Nyman, 1917; Psychologism, 1967). We have also
the contact between logic and the social and human sciences in general, and
sociology in particular (Ackoff, & Emery, 1972, esp. pp.248-264, and
chap.15; Elster, 1978; Freedle, 1975; Freedle, 1978; Mitroff, 1974; Mitroff,
& Mason, 1982; Vasa, 1983), including more "dialectical" approaches
(Datan, & Reese, 1977; Ilyenkov, 1977; Riegel, 1979; Rychlak, 1976a;
Rychlak, 1977).
The
historically most noted problematic aspects of the legitimate use of logic seem
to be those which concern its relations to mathematics. Such relations are also
expressed by the fact that electronic digital computers were from the beginning
often considered more as mathematical machines than as symbol manipulators or logical
machines. The most straightforward way to approach these matters appears to be
the consultation of encyclopedias which contain overviews of logic including
the history of logic (Logic, 1911; Logic, 1967; Logic, 1974; Logic Machines,
1967; Systems, 1967). It will probably be soon experienced that the range and
depth of problems which are met in the course of such an inquiry are
overpowering and distressing taxing to its utmost our, often superficial,
confidence in the nature of logical-mathematical rationality. It is, however,
important that such problems be recognized in order: 1)To put in evidence the
heavy responsibility of those who finance and, generally encourage the use of
logical-mathematical machines or computers with the motivation that they not
only are expected to increase profits but also represent some kind of higher
rationality in the implementation of human affairs, and 2) To raise the
question on whether our present
research in computer and information science is really structured in a
reasonable "economic" way to the extent that it requires such an
effort in order to get rationally evaluated and directed.
In
order to contribute to the second point above, the research that is proposed
here will use logic and some of its particular modern problems as an entrance
door into a realm which can be appropriately denominated as psychology of
science, or of
the scientist. Psychology of science, departing from historical attempts which
are practically unknown in our contexts of computer-mediated fascination with
positivism (Butler, 1926; Ducass, 1939a, as examples of empirical studies
besides the work of philosophers-psychologists like I. Kant; Ducass, 1939b;
Dumas, 1905) is well represented today in areas which are close to our own
studies of software and organizational systems design (Mahoney, 1979, with a
review; Mitroff, 1974). Such studies could be completed with special emphasis
on logic considered as a tool-support for the individual's and the social
group's search for knowledge. An overview of these problems in the theory and
application of logic (Churchman, 1971; Haack, 1978; Ivanov, 1980; Ivanov,
1983a; Ivanov, 1983b; Mozes, 1989; Myhill, 1952; Peirce, (Hartshorne, &
Weiss, 1932-1933; Schiller, 1912; Veatch, 1969; Veatch, 1952) would then be
detailed with particular reference to mathematical logic and symbolisms which
support the development and use of computer hardware and software (Nilsson,
1987, with comments on this in the context of a project on interactive
information systems). Examples of detailed studies are, for instance, attempts
to demarcate the field of application of logic (Kaufmann, 1940; Kneale, 1956,in
a rather different research tradition), considerations on the problem of time
in logic,
reappearing today in the context of data base theory, (Prior, 1957, esp.
"tenses and truth in the history of logic", pp. 104-122), the
"if-then" concepts, which stand at the base of most computer
programming and expert systems, (Geach, 1981, pp.194-198; Peirce, et al.,
1932-1933, Vol. 3, pp.279ff.is a "classic" approach; Quine, 1982,
pp.21-26; Sargent, Horwitz, Wallerstein, & Appelbaum, 1968, esp. pp.20ff
and 36ff), or, more generally, the fundaments and presuppositions of data base
approaches such as relational algebra (McKinsey, 1940). The proposed kinds of
treatment of logic for problem solving should be contrasted with the modern more
instrumental view of application of logic in computer science (Kowalski, 1979a;
Kowalski, 1979b) and earlier views (Gorn, 1964; Korfhage, 1964).
One
issue of particular importance in the context of computer science is a detailed
knowledge of the problems and debates concerning symbolisms, formal systems and
axiomatics. Such knowledge may start from more general overviews of these
special fields (Blanch, 1962, from which, however, the English translation has
symptomatically deleted the first two out of the five original chapters which
deal with the axiomatic method in science and the philosophical import of
axiomatics; Cajori, 1929, vol.1, p.431f, cf. vol. 2, pp. 281ff.; Systems,
1967).
Another
particular issue leads the research attention in the direction of what, today,
would be considered as an isolated problem of perception or cognitive
psychology having importance for research on graphic computer representation:
it is the relation between logic, "experimental logic" and geometry
(Jager-Adams, 1984, concerning the irreconciliability of logic and thought, and
compare with the fundamental empirical findings of Piaget's psychology; Nyman,
1928; Nyman, 1959). It is indeed tempting to regard such research as belonging
to some subfield of psychology and such a policy may be welcomed by logicians
who fear psychology and by psychologists who fear pure logic or hope to reap
the rich financing available in the computer field. The issue, however, is much
broader than that, and it is unclear whether such psychology can be
differentiated from the discipline of logic as such or, for that matter, the
disciplines of computer and information science. In logic, nowadays, this
appears to be seldom acknowledged. As late as in 1934, however, it was still
possible to find texts of modern logic which, at least in their introductory
chapters, gave to students and other readers a chance of knowing that such
demarcation problems exist or, at least, existed (Cohen, & Nagel, 1962,esp.
chap.1 €5-6, and chap. 9 €3, pp. 16-23, 181-187).
It
is not agreed today, especially in the context of discussions on applied logic which corresponds to the application
of computers,
that the above issues have been settled. They are certainly very much alive in
the modern work of the heirs of American pragmatism and empirical idealism
(Churchman, 1971) who, of course, continue the polemic in the original works of
those schools of thought (Peirce, et al., 1932-1933, chap.1, €3; Schiller,
1912) and of other traditions (Frege, 1956). Some historical aspects of the
oppositions to "psychologism" during this century (Braithwaite,
Russell, & Waismann, 1938) may throw some light on why psychological
aspects of applied logic are still banned today in the context of research on
computer applications (Toulmin, 1977, presents some courageous discussions).
As a bridge to psycho-logical
considerations it is possible to utilize here a quotation from C.S.Peirce in
his polemic against the psychologism of his time (Peirce, et al., 1932-1933,
vol.2, pp.27, 36, my emphasis. Cf. also pp.31-32 concerning issues related to
what nowadays passes as artificial intelligence, as well as vol. 3, p.266-287):
It
is J.S.Mill [in his work Examination of Hamilton, chap.21] who insists that how we ought
to think can be
ascertained in no other way than by reflection upon those psychological laws
which teach us how we must needs think.
But here we have to distinguish the case in which compulsion attaches to that subconscious thought over which we have no
control, and the case in which it attaches to conscious reasoning. In the former case,
there is no room for logical criticism at all. But because there is nothing to
be said against our thinking in a certain way, in subconscious thought, when we
cannot do otherwise, it does not, at all, follow that we ought to think in that
way when we have our choice between several ways of thinking. If, however, Mill
refers to compulsion attaching to conscious thought, what he no doubt has in
mind is, that a person ought to think in the way he would be compelled to
think, if he duly reflected, and made his thoughts clear, and brought his whole
knowledge to bear. But ...logic is not obliged even so much as to suppose that
there is consciousness.... The essence of rationality lies in the fact that the
rational being will act
so as to attain certain ends. Prevent his doing so in one way, and he will act
in some utterly different way which will produce the same result. Rationality
is being governed by final causes. Consciousness, the feeling of the passing
instant, has, as such, no room for rationality. The notion that logic is in any
way concerned with it is a fallacy closely allied to hedonism in ethics.
Peirce
goes on (vol.2, pp.31-32) developing the idea of truth as independent from the
conscious subject. These thoughts, then, have a clear ressonance in the work of
early logicists (Frege, 1956, pp.307-308) as in later debates (Jourdain, 1917;
Rignano, 1913a; Rignano, 1913b; Rignano, 1913c; Rignano, 1915a; Rignano, 1915b;
Rignano, 1915c), in philosophically more ambitious textbooks of logic (Cohen,
et al., 1962, pp.16-23, 181-187), and in more superficial speculations about AI
and so called cognitive science (Doyle, 1982; Haugeland, 1981; Hofstadter,
& Dennett, 1981; Turing, 1963) especially in what concerns the idea of truth being
independent of the who-subject represented by conscience, and therefore easily
thought to be embodied in an objective computer. The basic idea seems to be that
truth is independent of any subject, thought or conscience (consciousness),
even if these are necessary in order to apprehend it. Ultimately the same basic
issues stand at the core of the unending sterile debate in AI regarding the
question of whether machines can think and may be regarded as having, in any
sense, an own consciousness which would affect their status as
"automatic" versus "supporting" tools (Peirce, et al.,
1932-1933, pp.31-32 contains some surprisingly modern "AI"
discussions). The matter has more than "academic" interest since it
has implications for the controllability of the alleged truths which arrived at
by means of computer supported thought processes. Peirce's approach has the
merit of exposing the depth-psychological ("subconscious") and the
ethical content of the misunderstanding about the legitimacy and applicability
of a rational logic that has the advantage, compared to modern computer logic,
of requiring a heavy teleological final element.
A
proper research about confidence and controllability of results which are
obtained in logical computer applications can then follow different paths. One
path is a social intersubjective approach which extends logic into a social
logic in the spirit of Hegelian and pragmatist approaches (Ackoff, et al.,
1972, esp. the appendix; Churchman, 1971; Elster, 1978; Freedle, 1975; Freedle,
1978) which eventually may also suggest a passage from a psychology of science
to a sociology of knowledge (Knowledge, 1977; Mannheim, 1952; Smith, 1984,
adduces Mannheim).
Another
path is according to the hermeneutical tradition (Bleicher, 1980; Fisher,
1987, and other contributors to
the same thematic issue of the journal Argumentation, in close contact with
disciplinary logic; Jonsson, 1982, and other contributors to the same book of
proceedings from a symposium on hermeneutics; Palmer, 1969) This tradition has
so far not been developed in the specific direction of computer logic
(Langefors, 1980, is, however, an early attempt). Hermeneutics may indeed be
seen as basic for user oriented systems development in its aspects of
communication-cooperation, and interpretation of user needs which today tend to
be drowned in the fashionable term "knowledge engineering". In
general, computer and information science are close to hermeneutics to the
extent that the latter was early recognized to belong to the same class of
method-discliplines as statistics (Meitzen, 1891).
Work-oriented
design of computer tools (Ehn, 1988), quality-oriented constructive computer
applications (Forsgren, 1988; Forsgren, Ivanov, & Nordstrm, 1988; Ivanov,
1972; Ivanov, 1987a; Ivanov, 1987b), and cooperative design, esp. Scandinavian
approaches that are by now well summarized and incorporated in available
literature (S¿rgaard, 1988) can also be considered as more or less conscious
attempts to launch alternative forms of social logic with more or (often) less
capacity to bridge theoretically the gaps between the social world of the
computer user and the logical aspects of software engineering. A problem met by
some of the Scandinavian approaches (S¿rgaard, 1988, summarizes them) is their
reliance on eclectic material which evades common historical or philosophical
understanding, like for instance the "transaction cost" school with
possibly positivistic roots (Williamson, 1970; Williamson, 1975) running
counter to unrecognized systems theoretical difficulties (Churchman, 1961,
chap.13, suggests some of them).
One
further path of evaluation of "logicality" is the expressely
psychological one which takes into serious consideration what, as we saw
(Peirce, et al., 1932-1933), was called subconscious, and compulsion (and "resistance" in
modern psychoanalytic language) as related to consciousness and ethics. Besides
works by some mathematicians on the psychology of mathematics (Hadamard, 1954,
pp. 27n, 29, where the creative unconscious is taken in some consideration;
Polya, 1957) the issue has been noted in works which, as mentioned earlier,
would nowadays be characterized as belonging to the psychology of science,
relatively apart from logic or mathematics as such (Butler, 1926; Dumas, 1905;
Mahoney, 1979), to the psychology of learning mathematics (Skemp, 1986) or to
the psychology of symbol manipulation or rather symbol games (Bergler, 1958;
Fine, 1956; Fine, 1973; Halliday, & Fuller, 1974; Turkle, 1984), with some
relation to the earlier ideas of cognitive "economy of thought"
(Jourdain, 1917; Rignano, 1913a; Rignano, 1913b; Rignano, 1913c; Rignano,
1915a; Rignano, 1915b; Rignano, 1915c). It might also turn possible to enlarge
the concept of "cognitive styles" which has lately been applied in
research on computer use, in order to include the childlike playfulness of the
child archetype "puer aeternus" (Hillman, 1971; Hillman, 1979; Jung,
1953-1979a, CW 9:1), the "compulsive-resistant" behavior and
particular types of "computer personality" close to analog types
which already have been defined in the field of psychology (Akhtar, &
Thomson, 1982; Ivanov, 1983a, pp.23f.; Kernberg, 1975; Lifton, 1971; Shapiro, 1965,
esp. the paranoid style, pp.78-79). Such types in part correspond to more
loosely formulated descriptions in management literature, in essays of cultural
criticism and fiction literature (Calvino, 1988, pp.117-123 on
"multiplicity"; Hodges, 1983, pp.238, 485, 520-522, 540; Ivanov,
1986, p.135 on the "don Jun syndrome"; Musil, 1952, chap.17, 37, 61,
62, 89; Persson, 1976, pp.84f; Persson, 1987, pp.24, 90f, 105; Turkle, 1984,
pp.196ff.; Weizenbaum, 1976, chap.4 about "the compulsive
programmer"; Wilson, 1988, pp.222ff).
A
psychological view of logic and mathematics.is obviously implicit in certain
fiction literature. Interesting possibilities are offered by works which arrive
to the point of attempting an integration of mathematical-logical thinking with
socio-political, and even ethical-religious matters in the tradition of
cultural criticism (Hesse, 1978; Musil, 1952; Musil, 1978, as noted by Zellini,
1980, 1985, 1988; Rnyi, 1973).
The
phenomenological-existentialist tradition can also offer an entrance door to
the question of psychologically compulsive behavior in relation to will and to
the subconscious-unconscious. This is so to the extent that psychological
inquiry was historically included in philosophy, and the
phenomenological-existentialist tradition arised in the middle of the polemics
about psychologism vs. logicism. (Barrett, 1978, in closer relation to
technology; Heidegger, 1978; Husserl, 1970; Husserl, 1983; Smith, 1982; Smith,
& Mulligan, 1982). There are
phenomenological approaches more specifically oriented towards computer science
today (Boland, 1979; Boland, & Hirschheim, 1987; Dreyfus, & Dreyfus,
1985; Winograd, 1987; Winograd, & Flores, 1986). In spite of some interest
for phenomenological-existentialist thinking in Scandinavia today (prof. H.-E.
Nissen in Lund, S.Carlsson in Karlstad; G. Goldkuhl in Linkping; P. Ehn in
Stockholm] which has been partly documented (Ehn, 1988; Goldkuhl, &
Lyytinen, 1982; Goldkuhl, & Rstlinger, 1988), such thinking seems to have
lost its particularly psychological content. This loss is a curious feature
that this approach shares with pragmatist systems-theoretical approaches
(Forsgren, 1988). The reason for this may be searched in those aspects that are
shared by these two approaches, such as a similar understading of "meaning"
(Rosental, 1987). We will claim below that analytical psychology can be a
fruitful approach to the problems of cognition vs. emotion in designing
computer systems support and that, as an alternative to extreme positivist
approaches (Simon, 1967) and it can also bridge the gaps between pragmatist and
phenomenological-existentialist thinking (Rauhala, 1973). All this may also
turn to be relevant for the cognitive-emotive organization of databases and for
the computer support of "memory" (Bolzoni, 1987; Eco, 1987; Lurija,
1987; Yates, 1966)
One
advantage of using C.S.Peirce's thinking for controlling logical results is
that American pragmatism stays much closer than, for instance, phenomenology to
the hard technological and scientific issues of our Anglo-Saxon culture and,
consequently to the problems of computerization. It should not, therefore, be
difficult to incorporate into the inquiry some regard for early
information-theory psychology (Attneave, 1959) leading later to the so-called
information-processing psychology (Ohlsson, & Almkvist, 1976, contains a
summary) and to the presently fashionable cognitive science that was pioneered
in the 1950's (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) and, as already noted, was
lively criticized (Feldman, et al., 1976; Riegel, 1973; Riegel, 1975; Riegel,
1979; Rychlak, 1976a; Rychlak, 1976b; Rychlak, 1981; Toulmin, 1971). In this
perspective the control of logical results and methods should be widened by
picking up and developing the historical arguments of psychologism where,
however, the associationistic empirical psychology of the time will be
substituted by analytical psychology.
Analytical
psychology is tentatively chosen as an avenue of research because of its
explicit recognition of two (among several other) dimensions or
"functions" in the psyche, thinking and feeling, roughly
corresponding to logic and values, cognition and emotion, which can in turn be
either conscious or unconscious. An introduction of the proposed psychological
theory in terms of personality theory is by now readily available (Hall, &
Lindzey, 1978, chap.3.; Hall, & Nordby, 1973; Rychlak, 1973, chap.3) One
working hypothesis in what concerns the use of computer science and of
computers might be that the felt need of formal "empty" formal
systems and systems of symbolic notation, including the historical meaning of
the formalist tradition in mathematics, fits the attempts of human
consciousness to manipulate the psyche without being disturbed by interventions
from the unconscious (Ivanov, 1983a, p.20). Conversely, it might be proposed
that one fundamental problem in the successful use of computers in social
settings such as administrative applications is the sociopsychological
integration of unconscious contents into the collective conscious (Churchman,
1979, p.104).
Administrative
of statistical information systems, including their support by means of so
called knowledge-based learning expert systems can be interpreted as aiming at
the build up of a collective conscious of plural ego (Churchman, 1979, pp.72,
101ff.) constituted by many experts, as represented by the administering state.
In Anglo-Saxon or, rather, protestant and especially Lutheran countries the
state possibly even takes over the functions of the Church (Troeltsch, 1925,
esp. pp. 156-191, 297-338). This
touches upon the issues of collective rationality and collective logic which,
in the computer age, are to a great extent represented by the problems of
personal integrity, privacy, secrecy vs. openness or "right to know",
and professional ethics, as related to democracy, liberalism, socialism, and
the state (ibid.). Relevant literature that is not so easily available in
Anglo-Saxon countries has been richly translated to other languages (Troeltsch,
1974; Troeltsch, 1977) but there are several authors that in one way or another
have addressed the same issue (Ahlberg, 1974; Ahlberg, 1978; Gehlen, 1967;
Riley, 1986). At a level of greater detail such line of thought should allow a
treatment of the basic issues of computers and working life, by bridging the
gaps the socialistic or marxistic Scandinavian approaches and the details of
everyday working life considered in a Christian and classic philosophical
perspective (Weil, 1970-1974; Weil, 1978; Weil, 1983). This bridging would
possibly include also the intimate cultural nature of mathematics in its
relation to science and technology embodied in the computer tool (Weil, 1966;
Weil, 1970-1974).
At
the level of the individual person in terms of citizen or worker, however, the
capability of creating and using a computer tool or method can expressed as the
capability of combining or integrating logical-mathematical thinking with
perceptions, intuitions and feelings including individual and universal values.
This is then the point where the previously mentioned concern with the
subconscious and compulsions requires a complementation of one-sided cognition
and perception, a process which within the frame of analytical psychology can
be treated under the label of integration of conscious and unconscious in terms
of functions (thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition), and attitudes
(introversion and extraversion). The proposed research intends to use
theoretically planned empirical observations in order to capture the rationality
of actors involved in the development and use of computer support in projects
which are locally available (cf. the section on applied research).
The
theoretical background concerning the "hard" logical-physical parts
of the research will be based mainly on one particular systems theory developed
out of American pragmatism (Ackoff, et al., 1972; Churchman, 1961; Churchman,
1971; Churchman, 1979; Churchman, Auerbach, & Sadan, 1975). Regarding the
psychological aspects to be integrated into systems theory the theoretical
background will be extracted mainly from C.G.Jung (Jung, 1953-1979a, Collected
Works, in the following abbreviated as CW), and, in particular, from those
volumes where special reference is made to one-sided types of thinking (CW 6),
"directed thinking" seen as archetypally influenced logical rational
thinking, compulsion towards symbolic thinking, ego-inflation, etc. (e.g. CW 2,
CW 5, pp.14ff, 226; CW 8, p.26; CW 10, pp.211ff, 380ff., etc.). Since these psychological
approaches are not so well academically established in our country, their use
will be supplemented by a criticism of some of their main features. Such is the
concept of "type" (Hammen, 1981, presents a thorough review), akin to
the concept of style as in "cognitive styles" and in Wittgensteinian
"family resemblances", with obvious importance for database theory,
and with its roots in continental thought , including types and type theory in
the general setting of logical taxonomy.
These
discussions seem to be scantily represented in the philosophy of science and
history of ideas in Scandinavia
and in the Anglo-Saxon world in general with few exceptions (D'Aquili, 1975;
Dicks-Mireaux, 1964; Hildebrand, 1958; Mervis, & Rosch, 1981; Nyman, 1951,
concerning functional logic, Jung's types, etc.; Ribbing, 1861; Stephenson,
1939). They appear, however, to be more vital in continental biological
sciences (Hammen, 1981; Ulrich, 1981), and, in a much more restricted sense, in
semantic echoes in informatics or European computer and information science
where the purpose is to make scientific classifications by means of topological
analysis algorithms (Chandon, & Pinson, 1981). Curiously enough, however,
the most advanced thinking in this last mentioned area is developed in the
proposed pragmatically oriented systems theory (Churchman, 1971, chap.3), in
terms of morphological structural classes, functional classes, and teleological
classes. It is a development which albeit apparently far from the typological
thinking of analytical psychology, appears to be historically close to it in
that it is based on the concept of morphology (Biological homologies and
analogies, 1973; Morphology, 1911; Morphology, 1967; Morphology, 1974;
Owen -Sir Richard , 1911; Zoological nomenclature, 1911).
This
kind of taxonomical research, compared with much historically rootless ongoing
AI-ESS (artificially intelligent expert-support systems) database research
appears to be promisingly related both to interesting efforts in the combined
field of mathematics and biology (Rosen, 1985a; Rosen, 1985b), and in
"pure" biology (Portmann, 1954; Portmann, 1969; Sperry, 1935) with
their obvious import for the issue of "artificial" intelligence
versus cognition. It is also related to influential currents of continental
thought which stand at the roots of analytical psychology and to the earlier
mentioned issue of integration between, among others, between cognition,
emotive feelings, and consequently the body. This continental thought, which
may be seen as an alternative or a complement to the Anglo-Saxon approaches
(Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984; Klein, 1958, including other contributions
to the same volume; Zajonc, 1980) and conceptualizations of "personal
knowledge" (Polanyi, 1970) with its applications to work-oriented design
of computer support (Ehn, 1988; Granzon, & Josefson, 1988, presents a
summary). Such continental thought seems to be a vital inheritor of the
pre-romantic and romantic ideals of integrative systems-oriented natural
science as noted, for instance in the famous debate about Geisteswissenschaften
versus Naturvissenschaften.
This
heritage is sometimes vitally present in the creative impulses of eminent
scientists (Bhler, 1973; Dobbs, 1975, about Newton; Goethe, 1970; Knoll, 1957;
Pauli, 1955) and it is evidenced in particular in studies that relate to
Goethe's work (Born, 1963; Bortoft, 1986; Heimendahl, 1961; Knoll, 1957; von
Franz, 1974) including advanced engineering (Jahn, 1981; Jahn, 1982), and
certain integrative efforts of "Kulturkritik" in essays and literary
works or implicit in classical holy books (Calvino, 1988; Hesse, 1978; I Ching,
1968, as commented by e.g. Kuo, 1976; Musil, 1952; Pirsig, 1974; Zellini,
1985a; Zellini, 1985b) as well as
in the class of "the new physics" (Capra, 1975; Jones, 1982; Zukav,
1980).
The
accusation of being rather speculative thinking is sometimes bestowed upon
works which in this century have directly or indirectly built upon features of
the continental romantic philosophy (Steiner, 1926/1988; Steiner, 1937/1982).
Such basis, however, may have been the main rational philosophical anchoring
ground of particular efforts in computer and systems science which attempt to
deal with new and vague phenomena associated with the use of computers
(Mitroff, 1983; Mitroff, 1984, on graphic interaction). This qualifies the
issue of research methodology to be followed in our proposed research program,
an issue which is obviously aggravated by the ambition to escape triviality by
bridging the gaps between apparently so disparate fields as logic-mathematics,
and analytical psychology.
It
has been already stated that the historical aspect is an important aspect of
our proposed approach, taken will full consciousness about its possibilities
and limitations (Nietzsche, 1988; Toulmin, 1977). We are, however, well aware
of the common requirements that research should be also logical and empirical,
and, according to the latest requirements, even profitable. At least the two
former requirements are to be satisfied by our committment subscribing, without
rescinding proper criticism, in matters of methodological principle to
pragmatism, experimental idealism, and social systems theory (Ackoff, et al.,
1972; Churchman, 1948; Churchman, 1961; Churchman, 1968a; Churchman, 1968b;
Churchman, 1971; Churchman, 1979) being consistent with the traditional
"harder" aspects of science (Ackoff, 1962), in its general
methodological views, consistent with traditional views of scientific
methodology (Kaplan, 1964), and having succeeded to demonstrate its practical
fruitfulness (Checkland, 1981).
Integration
among different psychological functions and cognitive styles in light of
analytical psychology indicates that the problems of the place of empiricism
and empirical validation (Shapere, 1988), will be similar to those which have
been already investigated for the field of psychoanalysis, with due
consideration of the differences between these two main orientations of depth
psychology (Jung, 1953-1979b), CW 4, €€670ff and 768ff, or pp. 290ff. and
333ff; Friedman, 1964; Rychlak, 1981,Freud].
In
this context it will be noted that criticism against depth psychology has to a
great extent been based on a particular understanding of what is to be meant by
(scientific) experience, i.e. public, in such a way as to "exclude from
consideration any uniqueness of our own private experience. What other
observers cannot verify is not knowledge." (Stevens, 1935, unidentified
reference, p.522] Such developments of P.W. Bridgman's doctrine of operationism
stand still today at the core of what is to be considered as knowledge in the
field of computer based expert systems. These developments explain some of the
difficulties of taking into account the "ragbag" class of knowledge
which was lately named personal or tacit knowldge, and which is hoped to be
bypassed by renaming expertise and automation with the words support and
interactivity. In spite of the claims that operationistic aaproaches are
essentially empirical or, in a rigorous sense, concrete-practical, it is well
established that they make very particular philosophical assumptions, e.g.
about the relation between sensations and perceptions (say, of colors),
attributes of sensation, existence, experience, etc., "in an effort to cut
them to the operational pattern and thereby rid them of all metaphysical excess
(Stevens, ibid., p.527).
Similar
expressions of simple objectifying tendencies, against which repeated warning
were issued by, among others, even professional physicists (Oppenheimer, 1956),
have been found later on in the context of "research problems in
psychology which were mostly framed in terms of technical statistical problems.
It was remarked, for instance, that the difficulty of determining the effects
of "the experimenter variable" which was considered as "a
neglected stimulus object" might be surmounted by attempting to
"eliminate the experimenter from the experiment" and replacing him by
a completely automated device [sic!] (McGuigan, 1963). Nowadays it is clear
that there are alternative views of which are important research problems in
psychology, including phenomenological approaches that are so to say
diametrically, utterly opposed to operationistic empiricism (Ashworth, Giorgi,
& de Koning, 1986; Giorgi, 1970).
In
any case it is apparent that research about development and use of computer
support at the individual and group level suffers of lack of understanding of
the nature of knowledge, reality, experiment, validation, etc. Disregarding for
the moment that which could be learnt from the case of depth psyhcology it
seems clear that computer supported administrative or industrial work can be
framed in terms of particular human beings and social groups who are active
subjects or "experimenters" in an ongoing continuous experiment at
the work place (Apel, 1980; Churchman, 1979, pp. 56, 59-60, 122, 146-147, about
planning versus experimentation; Forsgren, 1988, about constructive computer
applications; Habermas, 1979, about communicative ethics; Ivanov, 1972, about
the conceptualization of quality).
It
is symptomatic that these issues of empiricism in terms of perception and of
the role of the body, subjectivity versus objectivity, etc. stood at the center
of the romantic and German continental concern for science. It was, for instance,
noted that modern mathematics developed historically during several hundred
years out from the programmatic and problematic Cartesian split of mind from
body. It is, therefore, rather late for trying to repair this split by
launching the concept of personal knowledge while keeping the mathematical
computer tool as it evolved from that split. The price payed for the extreme
achievements by modern science is an ideal of "knowledge
representation", such as found in computer science, which is intrinsically
incompatible with the personal individual participation of the body in space
and time, as well as in spirit and soul which belong to a required more complex
conception than mind or brain (Steiner, 1937/1982).
It
should be emphasized that such considerations include the all important
"method" as relation between concepts and perception, knowledge and
experience or action (Steiner, 1926/1988, pp. 107-119), where action obviously
includes human work such as it is intended in some contemporary research on
computer supported working life (Ehn, 1988; S¿rgaard, 1988). While, as already
noted, some of these issues are nowadays treated by means of such concepts as
personal or tacit knowledge, the pragmatist and phenomenological traditions
reconnect them to philosophical, ethical and religious aspects which require
taking stand on such things as the continental criticism of I.Kant's conception
of knowledge, including the nature and functions if mathematics versus
experience, etc. (Hamann, 1967; Steiner, 1926/1988, pp. 100ff, 155ff).
In
the present cultural climate, where pragmatism is often understood as
simplistic matter-of-factness rather than as pointing to the function of
thought as a guide to action, the considerations above may appear, in some
vague sense unpractical, abstract, speculative or superfluous. They are,
however empirical and concrete enough in that they have, during the last
decades, raised a series of debates in the context of applications of the
"queen of empiricism", statistic , to that field where statistics or
probabilistic logic meet the human mind in all its complexity: psychology.
Statistics,
which since about the turn of the century has come to mean applied formal
probabilistic logic including its extreme questionable expression in the so
called theory of fuzzy sets (Klir, & Folger, 1988, with a problematic
attempt to relate it to information; Negoita, 1988; Zadeh, 1965), should, in
its older form, rightly be
considered as a mother-discipline of computer and information science applied
to administrative activities (Ivanov, 1984; Ivanov, 1986). Up to this century
it has been apparently well known that probability may be properly considered
as a branch of logic, and so it was considered by e.g. Leibniz (Keynes, 1952).
The psychological aspects have often been implicit in the role accorded to
language. It was, for instance, remarked that
Confusion
of thought is not always best avoided by technical and unaccostumed
expressions, to which the mind has no immediate reaction of understanding; it
is possible, under cover of a careful formalism, to make statements which, if
expressed in plain language, the mind would immediately repudiate. There is
much to be said, therefore, in favour of understanding the substance of what
you are saying all the time and
of never reducing the substantives of your argument to the mental status of an x
ory. (Keynes, 1952, p. 19n).
It
will be therefore be important for both content and form (method) of the
proposed research to study how the meeting between statistics and psychology
has been treated in the scientific literature, since psychology by its very
nature of human complexity, taxes
to the utmost the capabilities of statistics.
An
important aspect of the issue has been often labeled as "clinical vs.
statistical prediction (Holt, 1958; Meehl, 1954; Meehl, 1957), and as the
question of "the unique" or of the "case study" or of
"the subjective vs. the objective" (Bacan, 1955; Bacan, 1965;
Baldwin, 1942; Dukes, 1965; Horst, 1941; Janis, 1958; Kilpatrick, &
Cantril, 1960; Shapiro, 1961) including the context of computer and information
science (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). The discussions lead
eventually also to the specific relation of statistics to logic (Bacan, 1956)
and to decision science (Cowan, 1963), which should be of particular interest
for computer science. They lead also to the classical empirical-mathematical
validation matters of parameter estimation and hypothesis testing (Cohen, et
al., 1962; Peatman, 1937, working in the more traditional spirit of Cohen &
Nagel), and to other works on statistical fallacies and misunderstandings of
technicalities (Bacan, 1970; Binder, 1963; Lykken, 1968; McNemar, 1940;
McNemar, 1960; Rozeboom, 1960; Wilson, & Miller, 1964). Such discussions,
deeply understood, do not deal with some bad use and misunderstanding of
dogmatically safe technicalities, but they rather unveil questions of principle
about the place and nature of statistical method with respect to proper legitimate
application (Nunnally, 1960). In particular, they put in evidence the relation
of statistics, beyond its unfortunate conception in terms of purely
mathematical expression of probabilistic logic, to a philosophically more
pragmatist view of experience and reality (Ciampi, & Till, 1980; Tukey,
1960). In particular, the central question of the unique case study, and of the
subjective vs. the objective, has focused the attention in the debates on
issues which lie well beyond the mere statistical ones (Allport, 1968a;
Bennett, 1940; Klein, 1932; Lewin, 1931; Rogers, 1955) and relating sometimes
to the formation of veritable alternative schools of psychological science.
Something
analog to the interface between logic and psychological statistics may be found
at the interface between logic and economic statistics including econometrics
with their great opportunities for applied computer and information science.
Hints about this can be found in a wide range of debates and contributions
(Menges, 1973; Rasmussen, 1957; Wold, 1957a; Wold, 1957b).
Econometrical
debates have a certain have a certain importance in computer and information
science because they also deal at least with measurement or with the
methodolology to be followed when evaluating the result or impact of the
computer application, e.g. on work result and work environment. It is then
interesting to note that such debates introduce considerations on statistical
technicalities which ultimately actualize philosophical assumptions about
causality vs. finality as they appear in the pragmatist development of
statistics into statistical operation analysis, and further into social systems
theory (Churchman, 1948 1961, Churchman, 1971, Churchman, 1979). It may be
fruitful to see the contrast with other approaches (Shafer, 1976, is an
example). One basic issue of history, as implied by econometric models with
time series, is, again, the problem of the unique and unrepeatable event. It
was the object of the nineteenth century's debate in continental science about
the nomothetic method of Naturwissenschaften vs. the idiographic method of
Geisteswissenschaften. To these two methodological poles corresponded
conflicting conceptions of statistics and its relation to ethics, as
represented on the one hand by H.T. Buckle, combining positivistic influences
from A. Comte and L.A.J. Qutelet, and on the other by J.G. Droysen in the
romantic and Hegelian tradition, who gave primary statistical research
importance to the unique (Liedman, 1983, pp.54-59).
Concerning
non-probabilistic logic and mathematics we should remark the following. In the
same way as the surveyed problematic application of (probabilistic) logic or
statistics to psychology may be seen as indicative for problems in the
application of statistics to economics and to computer support of
economic-administrative activities, corresponding insights could probably be
derived from the application of (non probabilistic) logic and mathematics to
the very same psychology and economics. In order to foresee and to appreciate
this correspondence and its implications concerning the applicability of the
computer conisidered as an embodyment of logic and mathematics, it would be
necessary to understand the relation between logic and statistics in their quality
of formal methodological sciences (Meitzen, 1891; Sigwart, 1895, for insights
into such a relation which, surprisingly, is so difficult to find discussed in
modern methodological literature). The methodological relevance of mathematics
in our research is, in any case, covered in the special section of the proposal
which is dedicated to mathematics.
Having
indicated in the above sections the methodological import for our research of
logic and statistics in its relations to psychology in general, and
psychoanalysis in particular, the time has now come to complete the picture
with some indications on how the touched issues can be connected to the
analytic-psychological literature. The statistical issue appears there in its
traditional form in the pioneering studies on word association which resultet
in the discovery of so called psychic complexes. In its more refined and
problematical form, the issue appears in the planning and analysis of the
empirical material which generated the concept of synchronicity or "meaningful
coincidences" of non-causally related simultaneous events (Bash, 1976, for
a summary; Frey-Wehrlin, 1976; Jung, 1953-1979a, CW 18, €€ 1174ff, pp.494ff.,
and CW 8, pp.233-234, 414).
Concerning
the more traditional use of statistics there are example of empirical
experimental work in the same tradition of analytical psychological research
which may generate ideas for possibilities and fallacies in alternative
experimental set ups or empirical studies in the proposed research program
(Bash, 1972, concerning Rorschach testing ideas which were proposed by Turkle;
Bellak, & Smith, 1956,in the psychoanalytic tradition; Dashiell, 1962;
Domino, 1976; Groesbeck, 1978; Hillman, 1975; Kadinsky, 1970; Kirsch, 1968;
Mattoon, 1977; Mindess, 1955; Spiegelman, 1955; Turkle, 1980; Turkle, 1984,
pp.320ff as relevant for interpreting use of computer support).
It
is, however, probable that empirical as well as theoretical approaches of
analytical psychology will be criticized not only because of statistical
shortages related to difficulties of operationalization of variables, but also
because they are not sufficiently social in their outlook (Moreno, 1976) or
because they do not incorporate sociology and political science in a sufficient
degree. There are, however, exceptions in this respect (Odajnyk, 1976, to a
still higher degree; Progoff, 1973). On the contrary it seems that analytical
psychology sometimes questions the possibilities of an independent social
psychology (Allport, 1968b, presents a historical overview of social
psychology).
The
answer to such criticism reaches beyond the earlier problematization of
statistics and empiricism, and it would probably follow either a
pragmatic-phenomenological line of argument (phenomenological in a Kantian
sense) not far from William James' thought, or a philosophical line which
according to Jung's own collected works seems to be close to the German
post-romantic philosophy. In any case it is probable that the basic tenets of analytical
psychology as a theoretical and methodological base for our studies will be
justified at a cultural level of discourse (Br, 1976; Homan, 1969; Karier,
1976; Kelsey, 1971; Rauhala, 1973; Rosenblatt, & Thickstun, 1970; Sanford,
1971; Tourney, 1956; Willeford, 1975). Alternatively one may follow the lines
of defense of psychoanalysis which has a somewhat longer history and a greater
volume of published material aimed at evaluating its scientific status of valid
knowledge, and its relation to empirical data (Benjamin, 1950; Farrell, 1961;
Gill, 1976; Hilgard, 1952; Hilgard, 1962; Hook, 1959; Klauber, 1968; Kubie,
1952; Lesche, & Stjernholm-Madsen, 1976; Loewenberg, 1977; Rychlak, 1976b;
Sargent, et al., 1968; Schmidl, 1955; Sjbck, 1978; Thom, & Kchele,
1973; Waelder, 1962). There have been also attempts at what can be
characterized as a psychoanalytic systems approach (Kubie, 1970) which seems to
stay close to similar directions of research and practice at the Tavistock
Institute of Human Relations in England. The systems attempts remind us that
the more we specialize and fail to pragmatically enlarge the scope of science
in order to include in it the use or application of laws and facts, the more
will increase the gap between theoreticians and practitioners. Theoreticians
will despise a trivial albeit (hopefully) in the short run profitable,
exploiting practice, and practitioners will despise an
"abstract-academic-speculative-scientific" theory and will try to
rely on "other types of knowledge" like
"personal-tacit-intuitive-practical-clinical" knowledge. So called
science and its institutional representative, the university, will be abandoned
to its own premises, and so called reality will continue on its own, out there.
Symptoms of such a tendency have been visible quite a while by now (Skaggs,
1934).
Psycho-logic
can finally, from what has been written above, be seen as a way to creative
systems development.
Creativity
and design are sometimes considered as dependent upon a combination of
analytic/logical and intuitive thinking, as a balance between quantity and
quality, as a question of restructuring, etc. Many of the mentioned concepts
have quite a long stand in the history of logic and of psychology. This section
started from a part of a proposed program for research on information
technology regarding mainly the historical interface between logic and
psychology. It was molded in the form of a "reader" and a guide for
studies through a great amount of potentially relevant literature. We would
like now to indicate in which way such studies relate to design and creativity,
and how they can contribute to better creativity in systems development. This
was done after having touched upon some pragmatist roots of AI thinking,
dwelled on the controllability of logical results, expanded the study towards
sociopsychological logic, touched upon the interface with statistics and
economics, and finally considered the potentialities of analytical psychology
which opens the door for a framing of the creativity-design issue. It will be
developed in a special section dedicated to creativity and design.
The
proposed research program considers computers as logical-mathematical machines
or "tools", and will therefore also study their application from the
point of view of logic and mathematics. This section of the research program is
focused on logic as a point of departure, and deals with the applicative
problem of the relations between the supposedly psychological "is", and the logical
"ought-must" aspects of computer supported thought. These relations
are considered mainly from the point of view of the interface between logic and
psychology wich, for the purpose, is enlarged beyond the scope of cognitive
science into the realm of analytical psychology. Some expected methodological
difficulties of research and how they could be met are illustrated, and
connections are established with the field of statistics seen as probabilistic
logic, and with economics seen as a field of administrative application. An
analogy may be also seen between computer information systems analysis or
consultancy for application of computer support, and socio-psychological
clinical counseling. Empirical material for the research is expected to be
furnished by the local administrative and industrial environment in the course
of research oriented consultancy according to the section on applied research
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