[1]This is a significant revision of the first edition.
It consists mainly of an expansion of the footnotes and of the list of
references in order to better support the arguments, and for purposes of
self-study. It consists also of a restructuration with some refinement of the
introduction and conclusions. A subject word-index and a new appendix (III)
have been added while the earlier appendix III is now numbered as appendix IV.
I wish to thank my colleagues and graduate students, in particular Erik
Stolterman, Åke Grönlund, Torbjörn Nordström and Anna Croon, for some criticism
which I have in part tried to meet in this edition.
[2]See Ivanov (1972,
chaps. 4-5, pp. 4.33 ff), the basic model of quality, summarized in later
publications (1986, pp. 47ff; 1987a; 1987b). The basic model was adapted by Ehn
(1973) and used as the original frame of the model for participation and
negotiations based on union involvement in information systems development.
This model was, in turn, taken up later by Mathiassen (1982, 2nd ed., p. 137,
fig 6.7), where the original link to my work is effaced, probably because of
the fact that the reference was dropped in further uses of Ehn's paper, in
making more ideologically explicit the "resource" dimension (Ehn,
1988, pp. 271ff, and esp. 316ff; Ehn, & Sandberg, 1979, p. 34, fig. 2.1).
The marxist view saw, for instance, the conditions of production as
"objective". I objected, however, that the explication or determination
of resources throws us, paradoxically and recursively, into the need of having
an "information system" for such a purpose. The recursivity towards
"fundamental assumptions" cannot be done away with the help of
ideology or secular philosophizing. The concept of quality of information
(systems) - as a link to Churchman's and Singer's work (references given later)
- includes also the basic idea of (co) constructiveness as it appears in later
ideas of constructive systems development (Forsgren, 1988a, pp. 51ff, 125ff,
142ff, 168ff, English summary on p. 177, esp. the 4th strategy of
"computer application". Page refs. to the first printing).
[3]The criticism, later
in this paper, against constructivism, post-modernism, marxism, language
approaches, phenomenology, existentialism, etc. should not be associated to
particular authors who just happen to use these words. In contrast to
Churchman's systems approach which I have explicitly espoused, or to the tenets
and dogmas of Christianity, to paraphrase what D'Arcy writes in chap. 4.9
below, it is difficult to dissipate what may be wrong in those views, to
puncture nebulous beliefs; for they are everywhere and nowhere. There is a
chaotically evolving literature in all -isms, out of which some "latest
book" which has not yet been read, can be adduced as a rebuttal, or
wholesale dismissal of whatever is said. Concerning, for instance,
constructivism I have touched upon some sources of its different conceptions in
an earlier essay (Ivanov, 1991b, pp. 18-25).
[4]See Bok (1982, esp.
pp. 46-47, 76-77, 157-168, 266-270), and Woolridge (1992). The ongoing trends
deserve their own new book on the top of all what has been already written. See
e.g. Ivanov (1984a) on basic research, applied science, business economics, and
engineering science. Ivanov (1985) includes an extensive bibliography at the
end of the book.
[5]Ivanov (1991a)
introduces in an appendix the structure of unpublished manuscripts of work
under way. I say approaches instead of perspectives or views,
because I do not approve of the "postmodern" sense in which the word
perspective is sometimes used in research nowadays. In my understanding
perspectives could mean for example apperception, a-priori, Weltanschauung, or
elements of a "Singerian" sweeping-in process, (Churchman, 1971), but
not any subjective unarticulated relativizing "opinion". By opinion
here I mean e.g. a viewpoint or whatever assumed "feeling",
intermingled with wishes, wills, perceptions, personality factors, or whatever,
in the wishful belief that one can bootstrap oneself above e.g. psychological
theories and above intellect. Concerning perspectives and perspectivism see
also Ivanov (1991b, esp. pp. 35, 50n, 54, 72), and Reichmann (1992, pp. 62, 78,
225, 252, 258), (1993, pp. 85, 129, 280, 286, 298f, 303).
Concerning the aesthetical approach to meaning of
information technology, cf. "computer programming as a branch of
cinema" (Linderholm, 1991). It has also been pointed out, for example,
that comparisons can be made between postmodern architect Ricardo Bofill's
buildings and Bill Atkinson's programs such as MacPaint and HyperCard
(Thackara, 1988). I have already been trying to identify some basic ethical
problems which are ingrained in a postmodern "hypertext" programming
style (Forsgren, & Ivanov, 1990). My contribution was paramount for my
motivation to refine the idea of HyperSystems (Ivanov, 1993).
[6]This stands in a
paradoxical contrast to more recent tendencies which attempt to rediscover some
of the more refined aspects of the dialectical social systems approach under
new labels such as "situated actions", "activity theory",
"action regulation theory", or "contextual design". An
example is Oesterreich's and Volpert's work in action regulation (Oesterreich,
& Volpert, 1986).
[7]In particular, this
trend effaced the distinction between the concepts of tool and of instrument
(in the same spirit as of the philosopher of science G. Bachelard), as they
might be applied to the computer. (Ivanov, 1988, pp. 98f). I thank Kenneth
Nilsson for having called my attention upon Bachelard's work.
[8]In an earlier work
(1991b, p. 81n) I summarized in an extense footnote a representative and
problematic standpoint asking us to keep faithful to the
"emancipatory ideal" inherited from the Enlightenment and represented
today by the trade unions, a belief in progress, work, and democratic
rationality. I could not refrain from stating that to this I feel seriously
tempted to add "Amen", in the original and legitimate sense of the
word.
[9]Which are the
envisaged stable values will be clarified in the course of the text. They are
the Christian values which eventually became summarized in so called human
rights, and became, further, reduced to matters of power. Since a common
tactics against conservatism is to equate it to denigrated
"fundamentalism" I propose as an antidote the reference to a reader's
letter "A fundamental error" (Blair, 1993), following a rather
careless article (as it is rather common in religious matters) on
fundamentalism in The Economist. On fundamentalism, pluralism, and
tolerance, see Reichmann (1993, pp. 79f, 85f, 92ff), (1992, p. 256).
[10]"Om också
forskningen aldrig förr nått så långt, aldrig till sådana resultat, så har den
dock förmått syfta högre, mot betydelsefullare mål." (Lagerkvist, 1959, in
the essay "Det besegrade livet", p. 141)
[11]Prof. em. Archie
Bahm, whose work unfortunately I could not incorporate in the present essay,
impressed me observing (personal communication, November 11th, 1991) that it is
remarkable that Russian communism and American capitalism are collapsing
approximately at the same time in history.
[12]These authors may be
related to the "spiritualistic" currents of thought, with names such
as Norström in Sweden and Lequier, Renouvier, Ravaisson and Laprune in France, that
I had already noted in my earlier struggle for understanding
"humanism" (Ivanov, 1991b, p. 14n). See e.g. Schuon (1975; 1986),
Burckhardt (1987), Coomaraswamy (1989), Guénon (1946). In a personal
communication concerning these latter names (July 1993), James Hillman
suggested that most of these latter names could be characterized as
"spirit people", as contrasted to "soul people".
[13]Piltz and, in
particular, Reichmann, in Sweden , Guénon in France , or Buckley, Bell, C.S.
Lewis and D'Arcy in the English speaking world . In Sweden, I would like to
point out also Martin Allwood (1988; 1990a; 1990b). His multifarious criticism
of present cultural tendencies, and "rowing against the current"
seems to express at a somewhat more controversial secular or ecumenic level the
same deep discontent - not to say "moral outrage" in Churchman's
sense (Churchman, 1982), which lies at the basis of Lindbom's work.
Unfortunately I got hold of Reichmann's latest and most relevant books on truth
and culture (1992; 1993) too late for using them as a welcome complement to
some of Lindbom's works.
Religious
and Christian issues have notoriously been considered in the field of physics,
a recent example in Sweden being Renard (1989). In contrast to the well known
book by Davies (1983, which seems to be well considered among physical
scientists), Renard seems to try to relate to Christianity, rather than to a
vague concept of divinity. In the field of information systems research itself,
to my knowledge, the only one to take up seriously the ethical and religious
issue, beyond Churchman (1971) is Donald de Raadt (1991). His work, which I
have not had the opportunity to study in depth, relies heavily upon the Dutch
philosopher Herman (Hendrik) Dooyeweerd (1958; 1975). The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy under "Dutch philosophy" (vol. 1, p. 442), introduces
Dooyeweerd as a developer of the Calvinist "philosophy of the idea of
law", which denied autonomy to philosophical thinking and sought for the
origins of philosophy in the special revelation of God. In my earlier work on
humanism for information systems (1991b), I preliminarily surveyed a broader,
if not more relevant, range of such type of literature, including Kant's
critical friend and forefather of non-secular existentialism, the philosopher
Johann Georg Hamann (1967a; 1967b) who influenced e.g. the economist and
statistician Eugene Böhler, close to the issues of information systems (Böhler,
1970; Böhler, 1973).
[14]I thank prof. Hernán
López-Garay for calling my attention upon Martin C. D'Arcy, and, in general,
for encouraging me personally with regard to the importance of these issues,
and for inviting me to collaborate beyond his "systemic-interpretive
exegesis of planning" (López-Garay, 1993). Unfortunately I was not able to
get hold of D'Arcy's work "Humanism and Christianity" (1969) in time
for this paper. Probably it would have been even more to the point, than
"Belief and Reason". I also thank prof. Heinz Klein for encouraging
me by accepting my challenge, and inviting me to try to relate Christian
thought to his and Rudy Hirschheim's "rationality of value choices in IS
development".
[15]In this context I
thank Gunnela Ivanov for her proofreading an intermediate version of the
papers, and helping me to decrease the number and gravity of printing errors.
[16]Despite my sharing
and endorsing the authors' arguments, this is not to be understood, the less so
in a working paper, as my "identification" with the authors in a sort
of definitive position, taken on exceedingly complex issues. I estimate that I
will consider to have reached maturation in the subjects of this paper whenever
I happen to be able to understand or be able to judge the interface between
psychology and theology as exposed by James Hillman, and the anthropology of science
as exposed by Bruno Latour. (Hillman, 1985; Latour, 1990) (I thank prof. Guje
Sevón for calling my attention upon Latour.) I relate these kinds of works to
current socio-psychological patterns of participatory cooperative argumentative
change of behavior.
Ultimately,
however, my (decreasing) doubt may be a sign of cowardice, as D'Arcy suggests
in his work surveyed in this paper. The remarkable difficulty I find in
grasping (the exciting!) papers by Hillman and Latour reminds me of the
difficulties in reading Heidegger. It may be time to leap over doubt in
D'Arcy's sense, by considering dogma in its meaning of bridge between
legitimate doubt and legitimate belief in Jung's sense: "The fact that a
dogma is on the one hand believed and on the other hand is an object of thought
is proof of its vitality" (Jung, 1953-1979, CW11, "A psychological
approach to the dogma of the Trinity", [[section]] 170). Jung's thought,
originally influenced by the pragmatism of William James, leads much farther
beyond C.S. Peirce's conceptions of"The fixation of belief" (Peirce,
1877).
The flavour
of Peirce's dispiriting and oversimplified conception of the problem,
foreshadows the reasons for the later criticism of pragmatism in this paper. It
is exemplified by his comparing doubt to "whatever other stimulus",
and the satisfaction (belief) of the curiosity in doubt to the satisfaction of
physiological hunger: "doubt implies mainly a struggle to escape from
it". (ibid. p. 66n, my retrans.) So much for the love of truth whose problematic
erotic undertones Peirce himself felt but did not seem to understand, and
consequently hesitated in expressing (1877, p. 84). Peirce's pathos comes most
probably from his perceiving the "ethics of logic" (Geach, 1991, cf.
D'Arcy, in this paper, chap. 4.10), combined with his avowed failure to relate
it to aesthetics and religion (Ivanov, 1991b, p. 43). I thank E.Stolterman for
calling my attention upon this paper by Peirce in a volume I had already used
(ibid.). Cf. a later footnote with reference to W. James' "The will to
believe".
[17]Please observe - as I
already noted elsewhere, how the fragmentation can also have as object the
concept of truth itself. Truth gets bowdlerized by means of encasement in the
boxes of smart taxonomies. In the tradition of critical social theory and
radical humanism, for instance, the approach to requirements specification is
conceived in terms of not less than nine "effectiveness
measures". They arise from a prior taxonomy of three "object
systems" classes - technology, language, and organization, and four
"action type classes" - instrumental, strategic, communicative and
discursive (Lyytinen, Klein, & Hirschheim, 1991, p. 50ff). After such a
mind-blowing "Aristotelian" exercise it will be very hard for the
critical social theorist to sense, for instance, the political import of
different kinds of truths relabeled "criteria of validity claims"
such as clarity, truthfulness, correctness and appropriateness, or
correspondence of depiction, sincerity, intelligibility, correctness (ibid. pp.
46, 53). I can imagine somebody sacrificing his life - like a hero or a martyr
- for truth, but not for one among nine criteria of validity claims.
[18]My translation of
"Problemet, d.v.s. uppgiften, är att klargöra verkligheten genom sanningen,
medan sanningen aflägsnar sig från verkligheten". Swedish readers who wish
to follow the details of Norströms argument may see, passim, esp. pp.
114, 136, 156-8, 162-5.
[19]This is done, in the
best case, with emphasis on "democratic power", and "empowerment".
This is still not exactly the case I know of a young ambitious consultant to
the trade unions in matters of information systems, who came to visit a
professor at the university. This consultant confessed initially to neither
expect nor need to gain any particularly valuable knowledge or insight at the
university. What was wanted was, rather, to convert the work already done into
a Ph.D. dissertation. The academic prestigious legitimation by the academic
establishment of the work already done would facilitate the candidate graduate
student's continued struggle for winning influence on systems development, on
behalf of the workers. Cf. the "partisan approach" in the taxonomy by
Hirschheim & Klein (1989), to which they attempt to contrast "radical humanism".
[20] Cf. key words such as
equality, participatory influence or co-determination, and client-centering.
Cf. a later footnote on power in pragmatism, and the pragmatist account of
power and the good in Ivanov (1991b, p. 43): The "making of truth" is
conceived as making for greater satisfaction and greater control of experience.
It renders the truth of any time relative to the knowledge of the time, and
precludes the notion of any rigid, static or incorrigible truth. Thus truth is
continually being made and re-made. To this process there is no actual end, but
an "absolute" truth (or system of truths) would be a truth which
would be adequate to every purpose.
[21] Cf. Ivanov (1991b,
chap. on "Cooperative work: examples of problems", pp. 55ff, esp. p.
70). Compare with Reichmann (1993, p. 286).
[22]Cf "The ability
to conquer nature is also the ability to destroy man. And of all the forces of
destruction none is more powerful than that which claims that the method and
knowledge and social organization by which man achieves the conquest of nature
are themselves no part of the values and ideals by which he may conquer human
irrationality. The social conditions under which man today conquers nature
makes possible not man's conquest of himself, but the conquest of man by other
men. Instead of universalizing, these social conditions particularize; and in
politics this results in squabbles over who shall conquer whom. Man's destiny
becomes synonymous with narrowing his allegiances, and in its highest political
reaches results in allegiance to nothing but power itself. Since no agreement
as to ends was initially possible, it should occasion no surprise that no
general end was achieved." (Simpson, 1951)
[23]The Swedish reader
can follow the insightful discussion of tradition by Rolf (1991, pp.129ff).
Further: democracy itself can, at its best, be a tradition. But then this
pushes us back towards religious issues as they seem to be implied in a recent
work on civic traditions in modern Italy: civicness is almost impossible to
create where it does not already exist. Anonymous (1993b) on Putnam (1993). Cf.
at the beginning of chap. 3.9. of this paper: "No love, and no community
animated by love, can be born from this egoism, for love exists already, as
well as community, and that because we are all children of the same
Father". This would mean that "The General Will" is collective
egoism if it does not square up with God' s will in the theological sense of
the word, and no democracy can come out of it.
[24]Cf.: "Once we
can abandon the primary delusion of subjective rational superiority - the
supposedly normal perspective of normal ego psychology - and its addiction to
meaning as relation to subjectivity, we begin to find ourselves living
familiarly, daily, in the mercurial, unwilled, irrational of otherness; the
whole world religious, revelation so continuous and hiddenness so present that
these terms become redundant." (Hillman, 1985, p. 314)
[25]Please note how
Churchman apparently nearly misses the point when he picks up this thread in
"The systems approach and its enemies" (1979, pp. 136ff). After
quoting a text on power, by Singer, he comments: "The word 'power' in this
passage is rather unfortunate, because the meaning of the term has been
changing radically in the last few years. To a nineteenth century mind (and a
part of Singer was nineteenth century) there could be nothing wrong with
each individual having more power, because it meant that he had an increased
ability to cope with life and its environment, and, in particular, to aid his
fellow man" [my emphasis]. But what about this being a particular
problem of, just, the "nineteenth century mind"? Why has the meaning
of the term power been changing so radically, and which are the consequences to
be drawn from the answer to this question? Is it this kind of problem that lies
at the bottom of the apparent inconclusiveness of, at least, Churchman's
chapter on "Ethics of the systems approach", and its apparent
dissociation from religion? Observe how these concerns become secondary in the
aftermaths of Singer and Churchman, as represented by one of Churchman's most
illustrious students (Mason, 1986).
[26]Cf. the present lack
of interest for the historical debate on the foundations of mathematics as
related to the foundations of the embodied mathematical logic of the computer
instrument (foundations of computer science and information science). Cf. also
the possible opinions on the supposed irrelevance of this essay for applied
information systems, and the fuzzy charge of "esoterism" directed
against the supposed "ivory tower" of the "old university".
[27]Cf.: "The moving
horizon of promised results keeps the image forever young" (Boland, 1987,
p. 374). Churchman (1979, cf. s. 169), writing on the pretended gradual
progressive "approximation" or construction, criticizes the lack of
calibration or adjustment to something corresponding to an objective "true
value".
[28]Cf Bourdil (1989,
chap. 82ff, chap. 4) on "History idolatrized". Cf. also Lewis'
reference to the historical perspective in "screwtape letter" No.25
(Lewis, 1942).
[29]Cf. Habermas's
substitution of philosophy of language for Freud, and of Kant for Rousseau. Cf.
also later "ecumenic", syncretist or eclectic tendencies in the field
of information systems, calling upon Marx, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. (Ehn,
1988) Lately, syncretist tendencies have appeared under the label of
"design". A contextual theory of styles in design of computer artifacts
is envisaged, and will be built mainly on the basis of a "repertoire"
of paradigmatic examples, in analogy to architecture.
The need of
"systematizing" the repertoire of paradigmatic examples and of
styles-in-"context" throws us, however, back into the "system"-
problem which I started mentioning at the beginning of this paper, leading
further to HyperSystems, etc. The idea of repertoire (cf. "toolbox",
and the Swedish "smörgåsbord") summons, of course, the problems of
pluralism, syncretism, eclecticism and of postmodern constructivism, considered
in part at the end of this paper, inluding appendix I. The acceptance of
historically defined and legitimated (paradigmatic) classes, or the
construction of new classifications or coding schemes, is also, of course, a
systems "design" problem (Churchman, 1961, "The teleology of
measurement"; Churchman, 1971, chap. 9). Form, structure, and function,
which exercise obvious fascination in the field of design can, then, be
accomodated in the interplay between morphological, functional, and
teleological classes (Churchman, 1971, chap. 3). Choice from a repertoire is
(ought to be) a "monistic" aesthetical and ethical issue, and
an integral part of the theory itself. In other words: each item of a
"repertoire" may have been a life long commitment and struggle on the
part of somebody, as often documented in the history of art. Which is, or ought
to be, your commitment? What directs your choice or
("Hegelian"?) synthesis of items from the repertoire, or of
archetypes from your unconscious, or of "partners to marry"? (Cf. the
references to belief and dogma in this paper.)
In this
sense it is true that Churchman's classes fall short of the challenge offered
by the relation between aesthetics and ethics. But, that was the point of expanding
the classes into Hegelian and Singerian inquiring systems (Churchman, 1971,
chaps. 7 and 9, esp. pp. 170ff). This raises the issues around Hegel and
romanticism, as they were foreshadowed by, e.g., Hamann. So called paradigmatic
examples can be, rather, understood in terms of types and jungian archetypes.
(Bär, 1976; Hammen, 1981; Philipson, 1963) This hints at the potential
importance of "theological aesthetics", to be considered later in
this paper, not to mention the importance of theological ethics with which
aesthetics should converge. We deal, then, of course, with much more than a
supposed "theory of style" seen a "conceptual framework".
For an overview of architectural paradigmatic repertoire in terms of historical
styles, types and examples, and characteristic features, please see Webster's
(1961) under "architecture". For meanings of "systematic"
cultural criticism of architecture, "style", etc. see Spengler
(1981-1983/1918, esp. vol. 1).
[30]I thank T. Nordström
for calling my attention upon the following quotation, by R. Rorty, whom I
already had noted as an interesting but problematic representative of modern
tendencies in pragmatism (Ivanov, 1991b, pp. 15ff on "History vs.
structure - Liberal ironic humanism"). "If we see knowing not as having
an essence, to be described by scientists or philosophers, but rather as a
right, by current standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing conversation
as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood."
(Rorty, 1980, p. 389). Please note the mentioning of believing and of current
standards. I think that here we may have one main point in
"conversation killing" and in the breakdown of debate, possibly
turning into psychological breakdown or war under the aegis that there
is not time, no money, no trust for debate.
Compare,
further, this approach at its extreme with Reichmann's reference to certain
modern poetry which assumes that the reader will give meaning to nearly
meaningless poems through a process of co-creation. (Reichmann, 1993, pp. 150f)
Analog thoughts on the cooperative construction of discourse have fascinated
some researchers in computer supported cooperative work (CSCW). Cf. with the
classical psychiatric case of Schreber where "jesting ambiguity appears significantly
in what Schreber calls 'the system of not-finishing-a-sentence' 'unfinished
ideas, or only fragments of ideas' which 'became more and more prevalent in the
course of years'" as quoted by Hillman (1985, p. 291).
I agree with
Reichmann that the mentioned poetry (and analog postmodern science) ultimately
implies an attempt to systematize meaninglessness. Such a mind-blowing attempt
overlaps with what I contributed to criticize in hypertext, with implications
for interactive hypermedia principles (Forsgren, et al., 1990). Alternatively
it can be seen as an intuitive vulgar recall of principles of psychological
projective instruments like the Rorschach test.
Cf. also
Hillman's opening of deeper interpretation of possibly legitimate meanings of
behavioral patterns which, in me, recall postmodernism (1985, pp. 307ff,
316ff). To the extent that (post-) modernism is the era of artificiality,
please see an original depth-psychological conception of the (constructive)
striving for the artificial of the artifacts, by Rossi (1992), associated to
the work of the IMES group led by M. Negrotti at the university of Urbino
(1991). For an insightful discussion of the aesthetical dimension - artistic
representation - in this same context of artificiality and in the tradition of
the sociology of art, see Bertasio (1993).
[31]Cf. the typical
accusation that the discussion becomes "too philosophical" and
inhibits conversation, and should be more "pragmatic". Churchman
(1982, p. 57), touches upon this issue in a problematic way, in terms of
"conversation killers". The idea is being further developed by
Nordström (1990). What is problematic is that Churchman apparently does not
envisage this type of conversation killing, possibly and paradoxically because
he leans towards seeing ethics in terms of "eternal conversation"
without exploring the content and presuppositions of the conversation,
as for instance Apel and Habermas, in part, do. (Churchman, 1979, p.
118, cf.,. further, Ulrich's comments on Churchman's systems theory in the
appendix II to this paper; Churchman, 1982, p. 57). I see this very
questionable view of ethics where "human" values are regarded as
"neither relative nor absolute", as an Enlightenment ethics without
beliefs and without dogmas, but with a dogmatic belief in the goddess of
(undefined) "Reason". Very rightly so, the acknowledged
"hopelessness" of the enterprise (Churchman, 1982, p. 57), in a
framework which has no legitimate place for hope, opens unintentionally the
doors to the relativism (and the consequent utilitarian consultancy's misuses
of his work) that Churchman himself explicitly and "heroically" tries
to reject. I think that it is a document of the author's "Kantian"
difficulties in integrating religion and religious faith in his work, at least
up to the end of the eighties.
[32]Observe that the
non-separability of sub-systems allows for their existing as distinct entities,
which, however, relate to each other. (Churchman, 1971, chap. 3.) Cf. further:
"For
the mother's dependent son, all is infinite, endless, with no boundaries, like
clouds or open water; all is possible, all mergings and identities...".
Robert Bly (Bly, Hillman, & Meade, 1993, p.261)
[33]Cf. Hillman who
writes (Bly, et al., 1993, p. 269):
The missing
father is not your or my personal father. He is the absent father of our
culture, the viable senex who provides not daily bread but spirit through
meaning and order. The missing father is the dead God who offered a focus for
spiritual things. Without this focus, we turn to dreams and oracles, rather
than to prayer, code, tradition, and ritual. When mother replaces father, magic
substitutes for logos, and son-priests contaminate the puer spirit.
Unable to go
backward to revive the dead father of tradition, we go downward into the mothers
of the collective unconscious, seeking an all-embracing comprehension. We ask
for help in getting through the narrow straits without harm; the son wants
invulnerability. Grant us protection, foreknowledge; cherish us. Our prayer is
to the night of dream, to a love for understanding, to a little rite or
exercise for a moment of wisdom. Above all we want assurance through a vision
beforehand that it will all come out all right.
Without the
father we lose also that capacity which the Church recognized as "discrimination
of the spirits": the ability to know a call when we hear one and to
discriminate between the voices...
The mother
encourages her son: go ahead, embrace it all. For her, all equals everything.
The father's instruction, on the contrary, is all equals nothing - unless the
all be precisely discriminated.
[34]An understandable
paradox is that the imperfection of the world can very well be acknowledged,
when such an acknowledgment can work as an alibi for double morals. This means
that one readies oneself to give up "virtue" whenever one is
confronted with power, or has to choose between truth and utility, e.g. in a
consultancy situation. The apparently wise, and patronizing, motto can then be
for instance "Life is a compromise". For an in-depth discussion of
the problem of suffering when there is no "compromise", the Swedish
reader can refer to Reichmann (1988) and compare with the rationale of social
reforms, rationalizations or "re-engineering" of institutions,
attitudes towards death, etc.
[35]Ivanov (1986, pp. 75
and 133) treats the question in terms of "solidarity". As also
observed in a later footnote, the Swedish reader may compare the treatment of
solidarity with Reichmann's consideration of the issue ("client-centering"?)
in terms of the Samaritan, in Luke 10:29ff (Reichmann, 1993, pp. 269-277).
Concerning Swedish historical examples of massive national moral-ideological
catastrophes decurring from a defective understanding of these issues, in terms
of Gunnar and Alva Myrdal's pioneer "social-democratic" thinking on
evolutionistic prophylactic racial hygiene in Swedish population politics, see
Ivanov (1986, pp. 145ff) with reference to Myrdal, G. & A. (1934, pp.
217-229, 286ff, 300-301).
[36]Cf. the discussion of
rule of law as related to equity and equality by Ivanov (1986, pp. 74-76, but
also, about equality, on pp. 46ff, 58f, 101, 104, 120f, 131ff, 139).
[37]Cf. also Reichmann
(1993, pp. 105f, 282ff) and the problem of morality as negotiation,
conversation, or debate (ibid. pp. 44, 80-85, 93ff, 126, 130, 150, 293ff,
including "client centering", the "debate industry", and
the "debate machine") (Reichmann, 1992, pp. 18, 29, 53f, 256f). The
importance of trust in empirical economic reality has been richly illustrated
not the least in the context of historical scandal bankruptcies such as the one
associated with Ivar Kreuger (Thunholm, 1991). More recently we have the
scandalous business events associated in mass media with the names of Robert
Maxwell and Armand Hammer. In business economics the issue of trust has been
studied in secular terms, e.g. in Sweden, by prof. Sten Jönsson and others at
the Gothenburg School of Economics (Jönsson, & Sollie, 1993), and Lars
Huemer at Umeå University (Huemer, 1993).
What does
not seem to be appreciated is that the same issue of trust, and the same
scandalous events, which seldom end up being disclosed in scandals, are
relevant in the context of the university and in scientific research.
This is the more so concerning the fuzzy performance of software projects and
information systems, coming close to the legendary "emperor's new
clothes". This kind of reality was obviously well acknowledged in the
psychodynamics of the Tavistock tradition (Bion, 1961; Turner, & Giles,
1981). It would be sensational if ongoing research on participatory design and
computer supported cooperative work believed to be able to dispense of such
knowledge. Mike Robinson (1984, pp. 11ff) surveys cursorily and evaluates
Bion's work noting (p. 14) what I consider the key problem: "the object of
truth apart from the group itself". Cf. with a later note with reference
to C. Lasch about client-centered therapy.
Consider,
further: "The entire humanistic, secular approach to therapy will be
experienced by the patient as the workings of the anti-Christ, because it
wilfully ignores, and attempts to subdue, the noetic, spiritual quality of the
revelations. We can draw the lesson for our times and our own work that
attempts at humanizing patients through group therapy and feeling encounters
will miss the mark so long as these measures do not at the same time recognize
what the delusions themselves state: people are not merely people, humans not
merely humans; bodies are also embodiements, disclosing in their
characteristics and looks archetypal presentations of spirit. An individual
human person is also always the bearer of eternal verities that non-secular,
non-agnostic psychology perceives as daimones or spirits. (Hillman, 1985, p.
280, with implications for constructive cooperative work, and for understanding
resentment.)
Please
observe, finally, that lack of trust undermines reliance on "roles"
or "social actors" as often found in theorizing in information
systems research, since these sociological concepts rest upon meaningful
expectations. Recovery of "democratic - cooperative - constructive"
trust may have much to do with recovery from paranoid delusions - seen as
matter of degree - which work as killers of conversations or debates:
"Recovery means recovering the divine from within the disorder, seeing
that its content is authentically religious" (Hillman, 1985, p. 278, see
also about God's "infidelity" as source of secular jealousy and of
humanism, "divinizing the other person", p. 294.)
[38]Cf. theological
aesthetics (Berdiaev, 1990; Sherry, 1992; Sherry, 1993).
[39] Cf. Ivanov's
reference to Maurice Blondel's critique of relativism (Ivanov, 1991b, p. 35f,
in the chapter on "Psychological humanism").
[40]Cf. Lewis (1988, pp.
110-123, "The funeral of a great myth), and observe the possible implications
for auto-poiesis.
[41]Cf. the earlier
denouncement of sentimentalism by Lindbom. Despite the distantness of
dialectical social systems theory from its original pragmatist and
empirical-idealist basis, I have had lately the uncanny intuition that - disregarding
most of Churchman's students who seem to turn back to solid good old pragmatism
or utilitarianism - it tends towards a sort of sentimental preaching tone. It
goes under obviously righteous banners such as "Toward a Just Society for
Future Generations" (Churchman, 1990). This was preceded by a long series
of interesting and important "Churchman's conversations" concerning
mainly science, ethics, and peace (in the journal Systems Research, from its
Vol. 1, No. 1, 1984, and continuing for several years). Nevertheless most of
these texts appear to me to have been written in the same sort of increasingly
sentimental mood which, curiously enough, seldom, if ever, leads beyond Kant,
to the kind of issues or of literature considered in this paper. I attempted to
formulate some of the perceived problems (Ivanov, 1990b). They contributed to
my focusing on the meaning of "humanism" and, further, on this paper.
My personal hypothesis is that this possibly sentimental turn in Churchman's
work is contingent to what I characterized in an earlier footnote as his
failure to integrate religion to ethics and aesthetics, at least until the end
of the eighties.
[42]I understand,
especially from Kant's writings about religion (Kant, 1989), that this must be
one of the Kant-inspired secular Enlightenment's main tenets. Cf. the secular
organizations AA's and Al-Anon's first step, of the "ten steps" for change
(a so cherished concept in both postmodern family politics, crisis management,
and systems development), formulated mainly out of practical modern experiences
in coping with, and rehabilitating from alcoholism and drugs: "We admitted
that we were powerless over alcohol - that our lives had become unmanageable"
(Anonymous, 1981, p. 3, 7ff). Further: "When our eyes and ears and hearts
were opened, we could free ourselves from our rigid determination to have
things the way we wanted them." And the 2nd and 3rd steps: "Came to
believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity",
and "Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of
God as we understood Him.".
[43]Cf, again, with
modern approaches of communicative action and rational argumentation, theories
of design emphasising the ethical "choice" of the designer
(Stolterman, 1991), and Tage Lindbom's distinction between virtue and morals in
the excerpts included in this essay. Cf. also Hirshheim & Klein's rendering
of Kant's definition of human interest as "a cause determining the will".
(Hirschheim, et al., 1989) This discussion is relevant for the belief that
communicative action and rational argumentation will eventually or at least
periodically lead to a meaningful, true and good consensus. Besides my own
efforts, a few research peers are presently struggling with these issues, and I
have already expressed my gratitude for their encouragement and invitation to
cooperate in this ethical - religious quest: López-Garay (1993), Klein &
Hirschheim (1992), Werner Ulrich's ( his contribution to this paper of mine,
appendix II), and de Raadt (1991).
[44]Regarding
ego-inflation, cf Jung (1953-1979, in CW7 [[section]][[section]] 221-265 and
374-407, CW9 II [[section]][[section]] 43-67, CW10 [[section]][[section]]
431-721, CW17 [[section]][[section]] 230-252.) Please, cf., further, the
appendix III to this paper. Because of the functions of the ego in mathematics,
formal science, and in the "directed thinking" of technology, it
seems that the field of information technology attracts gifted ego-inflated
people. It would be consistent with the remarkable psychologizing speculations
and preposterous claims which have characterized many writings on
"artificial intelligence" - AI.
The possible
offence caused by this paper of mine, disregarding the obvious influence of
shortcomings in my own insights, modesty, sensitivity and diplomatic
"social competence", may, however, be a product of ego inflation in
the broad sense of the word. By this I mean the offended people's, and my own,
difficulty of taking care of the feelings of aggressivity and guilt raised by
the text, contrasted with the subjective self-righteous feelings of doing
"one's best" and of having that which Lindbom names "good
intentions". In other words: "Why should I be criticized when there are
so many others who - in such case - are much guiltier than I am?". This
would be the result of what Lindbom covers under the discussion of secularized
man's negation of the imperfection of this world in general, and of our own
sinful nature in particular. This is, in turn, related to what he calls
"the socialization of self-pity" and, further, to self-righteousness
and sentimentalism. I may have, of course, sinned myself in this paper by not
giving more emphasis to my own shortcomings.
[45]The claim that this
is not necessary since we have been created in the image of God in order to
take care of this world autonomously, without asking Him for administrative
daily details. This incurs, however, in Linbom's criticism of William Occam's
separatism, (Lindbom, 1970, please see the separate appendix IV, in Swedish.)
It is symptomatic to note that pioneers who care, like Churchman or Varela, do
not shrink from acknowledging the need to dig into their fundamental
assumptions, also called the guarantor's problem. Autopoiesis, for instance,
acknowledges the links of its "powerful and informative methaphor" to
Buddhism, rather than to Christianity. (Whitaker, 1992, pp. 83n, 106n,
symptomatically in footnotes.) I myself, too, had identified the Buddhist ethical
anchoring of autopoiesis in its linkages to European phenomenology (Varela,
1992, esp. chap. 2 on "ethical competence"). One main question in
this paper, then, is which are our fundamental assumptions, and what
difference do they make in our conception of making science, and in daily work?
[46]The reader who feels
disturbed by the feeling that the works chosen for review in this paper are
rather "odd", may wish to relate them to other which are, in a way,
more conventional. First of all Buckley's "At the Origins of Modern
Atheism" (1987), and D'Arcy's more focused work "Humanism and
Christianity" (1971) which I got hold of too late for using it in this
paper. The latter can be a good substitute for "Belief and Reason".
Secondly, the Swedish reader may wish to consult the work of the physician and
medical researcher Sven Reichmann (1992; 1993), but also of an established
scholar, a historian working in the field of "history of ideas", like
Svante Nordin (1989). In his extensive survey which culminates with thoughts that
are consistent with the works and conclusions presented in this paper (pp.
174ff), he indicates that these works are close to central historical names
such as, for instance, Ernst Troeltsch (as a better alternative, I noted in my
book from 1986, to Max Weber) and, possibly, Leopold von Ranke (ibid., pp. 29,
73ff). I agree with Nordin's observations about the character of
"Nietzschean" postmodern tendencies, and I have identified them as
such in earlier works (1991b; 1993). In particular, I agreed about the
similarity between the rhetorical aestheticism of American cybernetic
constructivism found in academia, and European postmodernism seen as
constructivism in its cultural practical guise. (1993, chap. on "Other
directions for educational systems design"). Finally, I also agree with
Nordin's concluding references to "the apocalyptic view of history"
(Nordin, 1989, pp. 181f), probably on the base of Klaus Vondung Die deutsche
Apokalypse (1988), even if I feel that Nordin has not had the courage to
take the final leap which could bring him in consonance with D'Arcy and
Lindbom.
[47]Niebuhr, H.R. The
meaning of revelation (New York: MacMillan, 1960, first publ. 1941, p. 69)
as quoted by Hillman (1985, p. 274), who also quotes (p. 286) Karl Jaspers
definition (Jaspers, 1967, p. 27, 21), "Revelation...is the premise of all
reasoning...The understanding of original revelation is what we call
theology". Cf. the earlier footnotes on the meaning of dogma.
[48]In Sancho Panza's
Windmills, 1979, p. 127f, surveyed in the Swedish supplement to the present
paper. To the English-reading reader may suffice a reference to Carl Jung's
concept of "directed thinking" (Jung, 1953-1979, CW5,
[[section]][[section]]4-46). In an earlier work I coined the expression "don
juan - syndrome" when describing the meaning of this deviation of surplus
energy into restless activism, and into certain kinds of aestheticism including
"rhetorics". (Ivanov, 1986, p. 135; Ivanov, 1991b, p. 35, the
reference, mentioned in an earlier footnote, to Blondel, 1973, p. 9f.). My
early (1986) observation that the don juan - syndrome, beyond legitimate
Jungian "extroversion", is psychologically close to the clinically
defined "borderline" psychotic states of e.g. "pathological
narcissism", is reinforced by Reichmann's recent work, in its focus on
"desperation and dialectics" (Reichmann, 1993, pp. 122-132, 283f). In
accord with a clinical psychologist like Sass (Sass, 1992), he sees there great
similarities with all the endless debates which surround us, where outlooks or
views are contrasted to other views. Cf. the possible motives for preference
for "open" debates in contrast with supposedly "gloomy"
monological systemic argumentation. Please refer, further, to the earlier
footnote concerning co-creating poetry, and to literature on "kitsch
science" (Montgomery, 1991). The Swedish reader may compare with the
severe attitude of Ellen Key to what seems to be aestheticism (Key, 1903-1906,
Livslinjer III: Lyckan och skönheten, part II).
[49]As in part suggested
in an earlier paper (Ivanov, 1991b) permeation by a religious spirit may, to a
certain extent, be estimated by the degree to which the "theories",
or the argumentation, mention and allow space to intellect and reason for
attempting to grasp concepts like love and power in their relation to knowledge
and truth, will, wisdom, hate, forgiveness, hope, faith, dogma, responsibility,
trust, respect, prayer, promise, obligation, righteousness, testimony, courage,
temptation, contempt, guilt, sin, vanity, humility, reproach, repentance,
honesty, duty, virtue, sacrifice, friendship beyond cooperation, tolerance,
suffering, sorrow, evil, death. Towards the end of an earlier essay (Ivanov,
1989) I had, in context, a long quotation from Jung (1953-1979, CW5,
[[section]] 113) concerning the importance of the religious spirit in
scientific work and directed thinking. I take the liberty of reproducing it
because of its relevance, when "exoteric social world" can be
substituted for "nature":
"If the
flight from the world is successful, man can build an inner, spiritual world
which stands firm against the onslaught of sense-impressions. The struggle with
the world of senses brought to birth a type of thinking independent of external
factors. Man won for himself that sovereignity of the idea which was
able to withstand the aesthetic impact, so that thought was no longer fettered
by the emotional effects of sense impressions, but could assert itself and even
rise, later, to reflection and observation. Man was now in position to enter
into a new and independent relationship with nature, to go on building upon the
foundations which the classical spirit had laid, and to take up once more the
natural link which the Christian retreat from the world had let fall. On this
newly-won spiritual level there was forged an alliance with the world and
nature which, unlike the old attitude, did not collapse before the magic of
external objects, but could regard them in the steady light of reflection.
Nevertheless, the attention lavished upon natural objects was infused with
something of old religious piety, and something of the old religious ethic
communicated itself to scientific truthfulness and honesty. Although at the
time of the Renaissance the antique feeling for nature visibly broke through in
art and in natural philosophy, and for a while thrust the Christian principle
into the background, the newly-won rational and intellectual stability of the
human mind nevertheless managed to hold its own and allowed it to penetrate
further and further into the depths of nature that earlier ages had hardly
suspected. The more successful the penetration and advance of the new
scientific spirit proved to be, the more the latter - as is usually the case
with the victor - became the prisoner of the world it had conquered. At the
beginning of the present century a Christian writer could still regard the
modern spirit as a sort of second incarnation of the Logos... It did not take
us long to realize that it was less a question of the incarnation of the Logos
than of the descent of the Anthropos or Nous into the dark embrace of Physis.
The world had not only been deprived of its gods, but had lost its soul.
Through the shifting of interest from the inner to the outer world our
knowledge of nature was increased a thousandfold in comparison with earlier
ages, but knowledge and experience of the inner world were correspondingly
reduced."
[50]Please compare, for
instance, Whitaker (1992, p. 5n) vs. e.g. Heidegger (1978, on modern science,
metaphysics, and mathematics, pp. 243-282). I am also thinking, in particular,
of the careful laying of foundations by Hernán López-Garay, Ramsés Fuenmayor,
and the group for interpretive systemology at the school of engineering of the
University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela. An introduction to their work was
published in a series of articles in Vol 4, No. 5 (1991) of the journal Systems
Practice.
[51]See Lindbom (1970,
"Our daily bread" pp. 109-118), possibly appropriate for use,
together with Bischofberger & Zaremba (1985), Johannes Paulus II's encyclic
"Laborem Exercens" (1981), "Centesimus Annus" (1991), and
with surveys like Caprioli (1983), in undergraduate education on work
organization which reaches beyond the important, but by now so predictable
socialist - democratic message. Please observe also that Ivanov (1986, p. 133f)
refers to a discussion (Buttiglione, 1982, pp. 198ff, 224) on the relation
between participation, solidarity, opposition, conformism, and alienation. The
only source in English language I know for this discussion is Wojtyla (1977).
Since long I
am waiting for an opportunity to call the attention of our research on
work-organization upon the particular characterization of intellectual work in
the Ecclesiastes/Sirach 38:24ff "A scholar's wisdom comes from ample leisure..."
(and also 37:7ff concerning consultancy). Cf. also the I Ching (1968, The Book
of Changes!) on the relation and transition between the hero and the sage:
hexagram No. 1,"The Creative" (p. 9), but also No. 12
"Stagnation" (pp. 53, 448), No. 18 "Decay" (p. 78), No. 24
"Turning point" (p. 505), and No. 33 "Retreat" (p. 130).
That certainly does not square up with the conventional wisdom advertised in
the last 30 years of socialist divinization of manual work, or with the message
of the Chinese cultural revolution, divinized in many mass media during the
seventies, or with the insults against the "ivory tower". Today we
may be reaping the fruits of our cultural revolution of combined socialist and
liberal work-theorizing in the form of liberal ironic client-centering and
practical profitable market-orientation of intellectual work, including
university research. It is seldom one finds scientists expressing clearly their
feeling of outrage for the decay of intellectual work (Chargaff, 1971, p. 641: "That
in our days such pygmies throw such giant shadows only shows how late in the
day it has become"). In the same spirit of civil courage see also C.
Truesdell (1984a; 1984b).
All this
material should be contrasted to, and complemented with the theorizing about
the nature of cooperative work as found, e.g., in Bannon (1992, chap. 2.2.1),
and Robinson (1991). Please observe Robinson writing: "Equality, in the
complex sense of sensitivity to feelings, intuitions, and perspectives which
are not necessarily articulated, and not usually considered part of the work
process at all, is a necessary condition for undertaking and guiding [change of
the way people live]". And, quoting L. Suchman, he endorses that
"Actual attempts to include the background assumptions of a statement as
part of its semantic content...run up against the fact that there is no fixed
set of assumptions that underlie a given statement. As a consequence, the
elaboration of background assumptions is fundamentally ad hoc and
arbitrary, and each elaboration of assumptions in principle introduces further
assumptions to be elaborated, ad infinitum.". This illustrates the
relations between fundamental presuppositions of work, and the material in this
paper.
[52]"Optimism och
pessimism är den sekulariserade otrygga människans försök att dölja respektive
möta sin inre oro." (Lindbom, 1962, p. 145, my trans.)
[53]Cf. the following:
"The question then arises as to the reasonableness of taking one maxim and
rejecting the rest. If the remaining maxims have no authority, what is the
authority of the one you have selected to retain?.... New moralities can only
be contractions or expansions of something already given. And all the
specifically modern attempts at new moralities are contractions. They proceed
by retaining some traditional precepts and rejecting others: but the only real
authority behind those which they retain is the very same authority which they
flout in rejecting others.... Those who urge us to adopt new moralities are
only offering us the mutilated or expurgated text of a book which we already
possess in the original manuscript. They all wish us to depend on them instead
of on that original, and then to deprive us of our full humanity. Their
activity is in the long run always directed against our freedom." (Lewis,
1988, "On ethics", pp. 74ff)
[54]The Swedish reader
may compare this issue with earlier references to solidarity and to Reichmann's
treatment of solidarity in terms of the Samaritan, in Luke 10:29ff (Reichmann,
1993, pp. 269-277). In classical Kantian philosophy some of these
considerations touch upon the relation between the three critiques, in
particular between theoretical and practical reason. The Christian thoughts
presented in this paper do not frame neatly in Kantian philosphy, suggesting
that what is interesting in this context is the other way round, in which way
Kantian thought is framed in Christian approaches which are not
"classically" philosophical. In earlier essays I have suggested
recourse to the criticism against Kant, mentioning J.G. Hamann, Max Scheler,
and others. See the earlier reference in this essay to Kant's writings on
religion, which would deserve an own separate treatment.
[55]Please, consider the
following possibly relevant meaning of "client centering", already mentioned
in an earlier paper of mine. "As psychiatry takes on the characteristics
of a new religion or antireligion, a 'protestant' conception of the priestly
function has grown up in opposition to the 'catholic' conception. The
'protestants' have translated psychiatric theory into the vernacular, in order
to make it more accessible to their constituents. They have introduced
innovations in psychiatric ritual, like Carl Rogers' 'client-centered
psychiatry', with the intention of diminishing the magisterial authority of the
psychiatrist. They have condemned the arrogance of psychiatric priesthood, not
because they object to the therapeutic conceptions of reality, but because they
wish to diffuse them more widely than ever, rooting them in popular understanding
and daily practice" (Lasch, 1977, p. 135f).
[56]Please consider the
following:
"To be
sure, there are those today in philosophy who seem to be solely interested in
epistemic and methodological techniques, but care is required not to lead us to
mistake refinements (and sometimes over-refinements) of one part of philosophy
for its larger systematic framework. Not the least of the present virtues of
systematic philosophy is that it has not been caught up in the sweep of
employment as a handmaiden of officialdom. For that is often sneered at and
secretly envied. Just as often it is misunderstood and even maligned by
scientists themselves as being unwordly [cf. "esoteric"] (since it
may disapprove of the way the world is being run); impractical (since it criticizes
present practices); visionary (since it sees what can be done and ought to be
done as well as what is being done). Indeed, in certain professional circles of
scientists, the epithet "philosophical" is the final degradation when
applied to a colleague, even though to a philosopher the patriotic and
occupational chauvinism thereby evinced may seem the last refuge of a
scoundrel." (Simpson, 1951)
[57]Cf. Jung (1953-1979,
CW8, [[section]][[section]] 749-795). After an appropriate disclaimer for
purposes of modesty, please cf. the following, by Bly (1993, p. 97): "The
growth of man can be imagined as a power that gradually expands downward: the
voice expands downward into the open vowels that carry emotion, and into the
rough consonants that are like gates holding the water; the hurt feelings
expand downward into compassion; the intelligence expands with awe into the
great arguments or antinomies men have debated for centuries; and the mood-man
expands downward into those vast rooms of melancholy under the earth, where we
are more alive the older we get, more in tune with the earth and the great
roots."
[58]I have remained
impressed by the lapidary statement that "not only the Church, but the
whole free world of pluralistic, tolerant democracy is built on the blood of
martyrs and constructive dissidents". (Allwood, 1990b, p. 44)