Political
Correctness: a new Silent Majority?
A short
review of Howard Schwartz's Society Against
Itself: Political Correctness and Organizational Self-Destruction.
(London: Karnac Books, 2010)
by Kristo
Ivanov, Dept. of Informatics, UmeŚ University.
December
2010 (rev 110601-120219)
For a
longer version see below. Earlier versions were published 31 December 2010 and
6 January 2011 at the book's homepage on amazon.com,
and amazon.co.uk
Please
note that controversial amazon-reviews of controversial books may be object of
spam-attacks aimed at slandering the writers. This happens both in the text of
the reviews and in their ratings by readers-customers in the form "X out
of Y people have found the following review helpful". In its extreme form
this is exemplified in the case of Warren Farrell's book The Myth of Male
Power.
"The silent majority refers to an
unspecified large majority of people in a country or group who do not express
their opinions publicly." Wikipedia goes on stating that the phrase before
getting politically corrupted had been in use for much of the 19th century to
refer to the dead—the number of living people is less than the number who
have died. Today it may refer also to those who are intellectually dead, have
not the courage of expressing own opinions, or are victims of so called
political correctness, which is the subject of Howard Schwartz's book
Society Against Itself.
This is an important and timely book, an example of
rare civil courage in research on aspects of unperceived moral crisis and
societal decay, which has the same effect on the reader as the author's earlier
The Revolt of the Primitive (2003). A series of sharp analyses of
detailed case studies feels like blows of "Aha! insight" which the
reader will repeatedly feel later on when reinterpreting the meaning of many
daily news and comments in our press and media. Its message appears as fitting
perfectly my long experience and strong feelings about what happens in
universities, business, and society at large, especially in what concerns human
relations. It is a matter of questioning the family institution and religions,
feminist influences in legislation, homosexual or "LGBT" movements,
focus on diversity, sexual harassments and paedophilia, expanded vague
definitions of rape based on degree of consent and, not the least, the academic
turn away from organizational systems thinking towards the eclecticism of
postmodern design and aestheticism (see the book's p.175).
Howard Schwartz, professor of organizational
behavior with a background in philosophy presents a series of case studies of
destructive processes in particular organizations. The purpose is
to understand "drives" and their source in the structure of
members' mental processes, their irrational elements, emotions rooted in the
family and psychoanalytically represented by the primal roles of the Father and
the Mother in their relation to their children, i.e. images and relations as
basic structures of our understanding. Schwartz goes on in the whole book with
case studies where politically correct (PC) processes, characterized by weak
influence from the Father, because of their intrinsic irrationality, inhibit
rational debate, consensus, and appropriate action. On the symbolic plane this
rejection of the Father and its social role representing external reality and
societal exigences, combined with a sort of umbilical symbiotic reunion with
the Mother leads to expectations of a motherly caring society which adapts to
the needs of the individual, and is "anti-oedipality".
BUT: Does this explain too much? How did it
come that the whole, mainly Western, society after centuries of evolution came
reductionistically to revolve around the Oedipus complex, or the Oedipus myth,
if not from a wholesale subscription to Freudian thought despite the book's
vague theoretical disclaimer (pp. xiii-xiv)? Are there other culture-directing
myths or forces beyond Oedipus and anti-Oedipus? Many feminists would not
acknowledge it but they seem to subscribe rather to the Demeter-Kore myth. Has
it any relation to Oedipus? In other terms, the question is whether it is
legitimate to see "the organization" as a monolithic, or oedipally
bi-polar agent which in a Darwinian survival of the fittest should never be
destroyed or commit suicide. The organization should perhaps be seen, as it
most often is, as composed of various social groups or stakeholders,
shareholders, management, employees with their labour unions, and the all
important customers, each one with its particular directing myth. In this case,
the supposedly independent neutral organizational consultant or researcher is
simply one additional group trying to contribute with its particular (Oedipal?)
myth to the organization in its relation to individuals and the social
environment.
An important question is what could counteract the
failure of the Oedipal struggle, considering that from the beginning the
Oedipus tale was a tragedy, rather than a sort of engineering challenge
to be solved by the objective observer, researcher, or spectator of the tragedy.
But I see the main merit of Society Against Itself in its opening
up of novel insights and research about most important, if not tragic,
organizational difficulties. Because of limited space I will not dwell on
occasional perceived shortcomings at the level of detail of the book's case
studies but, rather, focus on its research context which shows which areas can
be studied further.
Otto Kernberg studied borderline personality in
groups in Internal World and External Reality (1980), especially in part
3 on "the individual in groups". The question is to which
extent anti-oedipality also explains borderline phenomena including (epidemics
of) pathological narcissism. And, in this case, why Schwartz did not attribute
the organizational phenomena he studied to that. Alternatively, why did
Kernberg not satisfy himself with attributing the most phenomena he studied to
anti-oedipality?
One most powerful precursor of Schwartz is the
neglected Alexander Mitscherlich in his early Society Without the Father (1970,
orig. 1963) where he denounces "the dissemination of an infantile
demanding attitude" in society and opens up venues for more dimensions of
understanding the death of the Father. It completes Schwartz's exposition an
analysis of the fundamentally relevant historical role of technology in its
associated politics of capitalistic economy, as if it were a far fetched,
forced "anal-Oedipal" (cf. Schwartz, p. 164) interpretation of Martin
Heidegger's famous analysis in The Question Concerning Technology (1977,
orig. 1954). That may be the origin of the feminist understanding, contrasted
with Schwartz's Oedipal one, for not believing that the Father anymore
represents external reality, since it is taken care by the paradoxically "masculine" technology appropriated and used by women on behalf of
Motherhood and children. Indirecly Mitscherlich also uncovers his unfortunate
endorsement of the problematic ethical-religious standpoint of classical
psychoanalysis in his chapters with such symptomatic titles as "The precariousness
of moralities" and "Prejudices and their manipulation"
especially on the "sacrifice of the intellect".
As things stand in today's discourse, however,
Schwartz contributes indeed to the legitimate understanding of the
ethical-religious dimension of the struggle against PC, which also facilitates
that humble self-examination and sense of compelling obligation which would
prevent PC. This is done in his chapter on "Religion against Itself" where
he considers the roots of Christianity as lying in the faith in the sacrifice
of Christ for redemption of sin (p. 79). In this, I believe, he
almost inadvertently touches,
but unfortunately soon also leaves, one main if not the only root of the PC-problem,
ultimately subscribing to Freud's unfortunate view of science
or, rather, scientism vs. so called mysticism (p. 199). I myself have come to
the conclusion that religion and theology stand at the basis of it all, not
because I must have faith but because they are the ultimate language for
discussing the grounds of rationality. As I remember a Vedanta quotation: "Where science ends, starts philosophy, and where philosophy ends, starts
religion". The attempt to define, understand and counteract PC by recourse
to the Christian message (by all means not Christian in the problematic
critical sense of the book's case-study image of the United Church of Christ,
UCC) is extremely difficult to grasp even for orthodox catholics. Christianity
decrees man's faith in God, in order that he neither divinizes himself nor
idealizes or demonizes others, and through faith in Christ avoids playing
victim and from turning others into scapegoats; Christ is the ultimate
scapegoat which allows man to hope for forgiveness for his own sin, instead of
projecting it into scapegoats, in which he ought to see Christ's suffering
instead of scoundrels' ultimate evil. The other way round: such an
understanding prevents the even worse phenomenon of self-victimization, being
trapped in a self-image of victimization (victim mentality), or of victim
playing by manipulators who self-righteously claim to be unjustly persecuted
while self-proclaiming themselves as innocent saints (a secular version of the
biblical "Book of Job"), or even identifying themselves with Jesus
Christ, the easier the less they believe in him. And Christianity, to be seen
even by non-Christians or atheists at least as good as any mythological
narrative, works out presumed anti-oedipality through the image of the Father
and the Son (and the Spirit of the Holy Ghost) in their relations to the dogma
of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary (and "Mother Church"). Agains
such background, mainstream feminism shows indeed a regress to the primitive
paganism of goddesses and priestesses, which in my mind also recalls the ongoing
ecological divinization of "Mother Nature" (cf. Schwartz's book
p.88f).
I estimate that in all this the great merit of Society
Against Itself is to open the doors for the need, on one hand, of further
sheer "evangelization" and, on the other hand, further serious
research on human psyche and relations, beyond the very relevant group-dynamic
studies by Mitscherlich and, Kernberg, mentioned earlier. In general, the
book's strenghts, consisting of exemplifications in particular organizations,
should be broadened to include a deeper and pragmatic understanding of ignored
dimensions of gender differences or supposed anti-oedipality. This has been
done in the past and the insights should be rescued for present and
future applications. We have for instance Lou Andreas-SalomŽ and her
work on psychoanalysis, religion and sex, grounded in her bindings to Freud,
Nietzsche and Rilke, as analyzed in Angela Livingstone's book on her life and
writings (1984). Approximately at the same time Carl Jung was developing what
came to be called analytical psychology after the schism from Freud which is
very significant for our purposes. This is portrayed in his chapter on "Anima and Animus" in part 2 of the essay on "The relations
between the Ego and the Unconscious", in Two Essays on Analytical
Psychology (Collected Works vol. 7, 1966/1953). On this account PC is
mainly due to Animus-Anima obsession, rather than to anti-oedipality. Before
that, we had the most interesting and relevant Franz von Baader's "philosophy of love",
as Ernst Benz shows while digging in The
Mystical Sources of German Romantic Philosophy (1983). Baader, whose
philosophy of love seems to be available in the German collected works or in
the edited Ramon Betanzos' Franz von Baader's Philosophy of Love (1999),
offers interpretations of the gender issue which are radically different and
deeply ingrained in the history of natural science, philosophy, and theology.
They are also symptomatically totally ignored by present main currents of
feminism and social critique. As a matter of fact, the origin of the perversion
of the gender issue which stands at the core of the PC-phenomenon is to be
searched at the dawning of reformed Enlightenment and the French revolution.
The political point of view in the PC-issue was focused by Mitscherlich but his
approach including a contemptuous view of religion (pp. 16, 188, 249) should be
examined in its endorsement of the so-called Critical Theory, for its
implications at the confluence of psychoanalysis, politics, and theology.
Mitscherlich gives there his problematic answer to the question which Schwartz
ignores: WHAT-TO-DO. Compare the controversial but revealing essay by Bill Lind about The Origins of
Political Correctness (2000). Ultimately one may turn to the
political analysis in historical and modern terms by Tage Lindbom in his The
Myth of Democracy (1996), on a misunderstood democracy which has clear
consequences for the spreading of PC.
In other more controversial summarizing
words, to get the most out of this timely and extremely courageous book and its
valuable empirical content, and to avoid its pitfalls, try to bridge it back
to the problematic but all-encompassing Mitscherlich, bridge its Freud
to Jung.
And bridge the book's implicit use of the (Schwartzean Father's) rather naive
Lockean, positivistic, consensual, "democratic" view of external
reality as criticized in Churchman's The Design of Inquiring Systems
(1971) to non-Nietzschean post-Kantian philosophy, Hegel, Schelling, Baader,
and further, to the philosophy of technology, ending up in theology and
religion. And, why not have a meditative reading of the Bible's Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth)
and Apocalypse
(Revelation) which eventually indicate why the apparent hopelessness
of AND- SO-WHAT, WHAT-TO-DO lies beyond its reduction to oedipality vs.
anti-oedipality, to the point of it erroneously appearing as a failure of a
failed Messiah.
Civil
courage in case studies of organizational ethics.
A longer
review of Howard Schwartz's Society Against
Itself: Political Correctness and Organizational Self-Destruction.
(London: Karnac Books, 2010)
by Kristo
Ivanov, Dept. of Informatics, UmeŚ University.
25 March
2011 (rev 111217-120219)
Earlier
longer versions were published 31 December 2010 and 6 January 2011 at the
book's homepage on amazon.com,
and amazon.co.uk.
Please
note that controversial amazon-reviews of controversial books may be object of
spam-attacks aimed at slandering the writers. This happens both in the text of
the reviews and in their ratings by readers-customers in the form "X out
of Y people have found the following review helpful". In its extreme form
this is exemplified in the case of Warren Farrell's book The Myth of Male
Power.
This is an important and timely book, an example of
rare civil courage in research on aspects of unperceived moral crisis and
societal decay, which has the same effect on the reader as the author's earlier
The Revolt of the Primitive (2003). A series of sharp analyses of
detailed case studies feels like blows of "Aha! insight" which the
reader will repeatedly feel later on when reinterpreting the meaning of many
daily news and comments in our press and media. Its message appears as fitting
perfectly my long experience and strong feelings about what happens in
universities, business, and society at large, especially in what concerns human
relations. It is a matter of questioning the family institution and religions,
feminist influences in legislation, homosexual or "LGBT" movements,
focus on diversity, sexual harassments and paedophilia, expanded vague
definitions of rape based on unprovable degree of consent and, not the least,
the academic turn away from organizational systems thinking towards the
eclecticism of postmodern design and aestheticism (see the book's p.175). And
universities may apply gender quotas and strive for gender perspective to be
included in all research projects, and for 50% of course literature to be
authored by women. But such perceptions of integral trends and explanations of
complex phenomena are also what historically characterize the effect on the
reader or listener of archetypal or mythical dramas like the one which lies at
the basis of the book's theoretical approach.
Howard Schwartz, professor of organizational
behavior with a background in philosophy presents a series of case studies of
destructive processes in particular organizations. These include the Jayson
Blair scandal at the New York Times, an advertising campaign by the
United Church of Christ, the destruction of employee morale at the Ford Motor
Company and the Cincinnati Police Department, the self-destruction of Antioch
College, and the forcing out of president Larry Summers at Harvard University,
concluding with reflections on the events represented by Princess Diana in relation
to
Queen Elizabeth as the national symbol of the United Kingdom. His question is "how did that happen and why?".
The purpose is to
understand "drives" and their source in the structure of members'
mental processes, their irrational elements, emotions rooted in the family and
psychoanalytically represented by the primal roles of the Father and the Mother
in their relation to their children, i.e. images and relations as basic structures
of our understanding. Early in the child's life the primordial Mother is
experienced as the world, and her love is ideally absolute,
unconditional, omnipotent, entirely beneficent and sufficient. The Father
enters gradually in the life of the child as a stranger, representative of an
indifferent or hostile external world which he mediates to both the mother and
the child, both protecting and menacing to rupture their intimate relationship.
Schwartz goes on summarizing the psychoanalytic scheme for two different
patterns of ideal development of the Boy and the Girl, and he explains how
modern society has weakened the mothers' and the children's perception of the
Father to the point of effacing their power of adaptation to external reality.
The grown up children as members of the organizations which build up modern
society begin feeling and acting as frustrated, omnipotent but paradoxically
unjustly oppressed potential mothers, or powerless, valueless and humiliated
fathers endowed to societal compensation. They deal, as it were, with a virtual
reality which is the result of their wishful thinking and resentment, and
therefore requiring from themselves and others a so called political
correctness, PC. Schwartz goes on in the whole book with case studies where
PC-processes, because of their intrinsic irrationality, inhibit rational
debate, consensus, and appropriate action. Adaptive and creative behavior
necessary for adaptation to external constraints and arising opportunities is
thwarted and turns into auto-destruction. On the symbolic plane this
corresponds to the rejection of the Father and its social role representing
external reality and societal exigences, combined with a sort of umbilical
symbiotic reunion with the Mother and expectations of a motherly caring society
which adapts to the needs of the individual. This process leading to a failed
resolution of what in psychoanalysis is the Oedipal conflict is, then, called
anti-oedipality.
BUT: Does this explain too much? How did it
come that the whole, mainly Western, society after centuries of evolution came
reductionistically to revolve around the Oedipus complex, or the Oedipus myth,
fending the whole issue into oedipality versus anti-oedipality? The question is
where this fundamental classification comes from, if not from a wholesale
subscription to Freudian thought despite the book's vague theoretical
disclaimer (pp. xiii-xiv) combined with other theoretical constructs like
"multilevel analysis" (p. 52) whose methodological status I confess
I
have difficulty to understand. And beyond Oedipus, were there any other fellows
around? Are there other culture-directing myths or forces beyond Oedipus and
anti-Oedipus? A John Gray makes up his reputation with Men are from Mars, Women
are from Venus (1993). A Philip Zimbardo grounds the solution of his Lucifer
Effect (2007) on Apollo vs. Dionysus, possibly in an unconscious unholy
alliance with a stoic
philosophical background of cognitivism. Many feminists would not
acknowledge it but they seem to subscribe rather to the Demeter-Kore myth. Has
it any relation to Oedipus? In other terms, the question is whether it is
legitimate to see "the organization" as a monolithic, or oedipally
bi-polar agent which in a Darwinian survival of the fittest should never be
destroyed or commit suicide, something which is seriously considered in other
organizational thinking as West Churchman's The Systems Approach and its
Enemies (1979, pp. 207ff.) The organization should perhaps be seen, as it
most often is, as composed of various social groups or stakeholders,
shareholders, management, employees with their labour unions, and the all
important customers, each one with its particular directing myth. In this case,
the supposedly independent neutral organizational consultant or researcher is
simply one additional group trying to contribute with its particular (Oedipal?)
myth to the organization in its relation to individuals and the social
environment.
The reader can then begin asking himself whether
there are other various myths complementing the psychoanalytic Oedipal
narrative, and in doing so trying to qualify the particular theoretical
approach by expanding psychoanalysis, including for instance Jungian analytic
psychology with its encompassing of multiple myths and its roots, common with
psychoanalysis, in German post-Kantian philosophy. This seems to be necessary
if one asks which are the forces or drives - whatever their theoretical status
is - pushing into a supposed anti-oedipality, and which is their nature. It is
the same question as to what counteracts the failure of the Oedipal struggle,
considering that from the beginning the Oedipus tale was a tragedy,
rather than a sort of engineering challenge to be solved by the objective
observer, researcher, or spectator of the tragedy. But I see the main merit of Society
Against Itself in its opening up of novel insights and research
about most important, if not tragic, organizational difficulties. In my review
I will try to survey several parallel avenues for a follow up of this
investigation. Because of limited space I will not dwell on occasional
perceived shortcomings at the level of detail of the book's case studies. My
remarks will risk to be perceived as name-dropping but my purpose is to put the
book and the reader in a research context which fosters a deeper evaluation and
future progress in the problem area.
To begin with we have Wilfred Bion's organizational
studies in Experiences in Groups (1961) which suggested his triad,
dependency, fight-flight and pairing. His work apparently goes behind the
Oedipal level, postulating the existence of still more primitive so called
part-object and projective identifications which I myself associate with
mythological objects. Seen as a research report Society Against Itself would
need a justification of why it would be sufficient to explain the organizational
phenomena with the Oedipal identifications, motivating a neglect
of related schools of thought. The remaining feeling of "and so what -
what to do?" after reading the book perhaps exposes an insufficiency in
this respect.
We have also Otto Kernberg's studies of borderline
personality organizations, as summarized from the point of view of
organizational pathology in Internal World and External Reality (1980),
especially in part 3 on "the individual in groups". The
question is to which extent anti-oedipality also explains borderline phenomena
including (epidemics of) pathological narcissism. And, in this case, why
Schwartz did not attribute the organizational phenomena he studied to that.
Pathological narcissism, borderline syndrome or narcissistic personality
disorder which has at least the advantage of offering the status of
elaborated diagnoses and prognoses with ICD- and MeSH-codes in the
classifications of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and
Related Health Problems, and Medical Subject Headings. Alternatively, why did
Kernberg not satisfy himself with attributing the most phenomena he studied to
anti-oedipality?
One most powerful precursor of Schwartz is,
however, Alexander Mitscherlich in his early Society Without the Father (1970/1963)
where he denounces "the dissemination of an infantile
demanding attitude" in society and opens up venues for more dimensions of
understanding the death of the Father. It adds to Schwartz's exposition an
analysis of the fundamentally relevant historical role of technology in its
associated politics of capitalistic economy, as if it were a far fetched,
forced "anal-Oedipal" (cf. Schwartz, p. 164) interpretation of Martin
Heidegger's famous analysis in The Question Concerning Technology (1977/1954).
That may be the origin of the feminist understanding, contrasted with Schwartz's
Oedipal one, for not believing that the Father anymore
represents external reality, since it is taken care by the paradoxically "masculine" technology appropriated and used by women on behalf of
Motherhood and children. And technology, if archetypal at all, relates to
Daedalus-Icarus, rather than to Oedipus. Indirectly Mitscherlich also uncovers
his unfortunate endorsement of the problematic ethical-religious standpoint of
classical psychoanalysis in his chapters with such symptomatic titles as "The
precariousness of moralities" and "Prejudices and their
manipulation", especially the "sacrifice of the intellect". For
a contrasting, adequate theological account of these aspects of technology one
can recur to the epochal study by Mitcham & Grote (editors, Theology and
Technology, 1984)
As things stand in today's discourse, however,
Schwartz contributes indeed to the legitimate understanding of the ethical-religious
dimension of the struggle against PC, which also facilitates that humble
self-examination and sense of compelling obligation which would prevent PC.
This is done in his chapter on "Religion against Itself" where he
considers the roots of Christianity as lying in the faith in the sacrifice of
Christ for redemption of sin (p. 79). In this, I believe, he almost inadvertently touches, but unfortunately soon
also leaves, one main if not the only root of the PC-problem, ultimately
subscribing to Freud's unfortunate view of science or, rather, scientism vs.
so
called mysticism (p. 199). I myself have come to the conclusion that religion
and theology stand at the basis of it all, not because I must have faith but
because they are the ultimate language for discussing the grounds of
rationality. As I remember a Vedanta quotation: "Where science ends,
starts philosophy, and where philosophy ends, starts religion". The
attempt to define, understand and counteract PC by recourse to the Christian
message (by all means not Christian in the problematic critical sense of the
book's image of the United Church of Christ, UCC) is extremely difficult to
grasp even for orthodox catholics. It requires committed study and reflection.
The only simple explanatory text I know is unfortunately available only to
Scandinavian readers through the Danish original and Swedish translation of Sżren
Ulrik Thomsen's chapter "Pro Ecclesia" in his and Fredrik
Stjernfelt's co-authored book Kritik af den Negative Opbyggelighed (A
critique of negativism or, literally, of negative edification;
Copenhagen, 2005) to be compared with Schwartz's own references to unexplained
negation (pp. 158, 175): Christianity decrees man's faith in God, in order that
he neither divinizes himself nor idealizes or demonizes others, and through
faith in Christ avoids playing victim and from turning others into scapegoats;
Christ is the ultimate scapegoat which allows man to hope for forgiveness for
his own sin, instead of projecting it into scapegoats, in which he ought to see
Christ's suffering instead of scoundrels' ultimate evil. The other way round:
such an understanding prevents the even worse phenomenon of self-victimization,
being trapped in a self-image of victimization (victim mentality), or of victim
playing by manipulators who self-righteously claim to be unjustly persecuted
while self-proclaiming themselves as innocent saints (a secular version of the
biblical "Book of Job"), or even identifying themselves with Jesus
Christ, the easier the less they believe in him. And Christianity, to be seen
even by non-Christians or atheists at least as good as any mythological narrative,
works out presumed anti-oedipality through the image of the Father and the Son
(and the Spirit of the Holy Ghost) in their relations to the dogma of the
Assumption of the Virgin Mary. Compare many feminists' wholesale rejection of
not only the Father but also of the image of the Virgin Mary, not to mention
the "Mother Church". In the realm of psychology this was well
recognized by Carl Jung (in "Answer to Job", Collected Works CW
11, ¤748 ff.) as a dogma of extreme importance and, possibly, the solution for
a genuine catholic Christian ("Oedipal") feminism. If not so,
feminism shows indeed a regress to the primitive paganism of goddesses and
priestesses, which in my mind also recalls the ongoing ecological divinization
of "Mother Nature" (cf. Schwartz's book p.88f).
The very same transposition of psychoanalytical
Oedipal terms into cultural Christian and political terms is achieved by the
Swedish political scientist Tage Lindbom
in his book The Myth of
Democracy (1996, orig. 1991, p. 26f.) He reminds that expulsion
from Paradise [cf. the Oedipal Mother] means entry into the profane world [of
the Oedipal Father] with all of its forms of limitation, contradiction, and
conflict. But the paradisiacal, primordial state of peace, serenity, and
freedom from conflict lives on in man as a "memory", and therefore
modern man dreams of a lost Paradise, even in socialistic and communistic
speculations. Fairy tales and dreams can give what harsh, profane reality
cannot provide. In contrast, traditional man is conscious of the conditions
that inexorably govern creation. He knows that this brutal reality is a
consequence of this expulsion from Paradise and that this is his destiny. He
knows that a dream is a dream, that the world is what it is, and that man is
what he is, that is, potentially a saint, potentially a villain. Traditional
man knows that he cannot dream himself away from his earthly existence.
Secularized man, on the contrary, has lost this elementary wisdom. When he
enters a world of tales and make-believe, the cherished daydream has a
different content: almighty human power will realize terrestrial perfection.
He
lacks a consciousness of the divine Father's presence in the world and senses
an emptiness and meaningslessness that stimulates him to give himself up to
endless narcissistic imaginings and speculations, which replace reality.
All this, of course, will sound meaningless for
most people who, despite of all ongoing talk about multiculturalism,
globalization or diversity never tried to understand neither religion nor
theology, and it is also a measure of the communicative challenge that an
author like Schwartz has to face. But it should make a lot of sense if
one realizes that the great religions in general and Christianity in particular
can be seen as synthesising interrelated and conflicting multiple myths beyond
the Oedipal one which happens to be the focus of the psychoanalytic approach.
The enormous problem of the intertwining of myths which is considered as solved
into Christianity, and is ultimately omitted in Society Against Itself can
be appreciated in James Hillman's work on "The Great Mother and her
son, hero, and puer" in the very relevant edited book Fathers and
Mothers (Spring, 1973) where four other authors also write valuable
contributions on our matter. Hillman's essay was reworked later into a chapter
of his book Senex and Puer (2006). In Fathers and Mothers he writes
(p. 77, 83): "Attis, Adonis, Hippolitus, Phaeton, Tamuz, Endymion,
Oedipus are examples of this erotic band [between the Great Goddess and her
young male consort, her son, her lover, her priest]; the Oedipus complex is but
one pattern of son and mother which produces those fateful entanglements of
spirit with matter which in the twentieth century we have learned to call
neurotic...The missing father is the absent father of our culture, the viable
senex who provides not daily bread but spirit through meaning and order. He is
the dead God who offered a focus for spiritual things, and without which, we
turn to dreams and oracles [cf. PC-phenomena], rather than to prayer, code,
tradition and ritual. When mother replaces father, magic substitutes for logos,
and son-priests contaminate the puer spirit." Before this Hillman states
that the idea of "the mother complex" still dominates in the analysis
of young men: it is still considered to be the background of the "puer
problem" and of "the ego development" but he believes that this
is a dreadful mistake having both individual and collective consequences. Among
them comes a sort of design-aestheticism: beauty, instead of reflecting
Platonic ideals as a revelation of the essence of value, narrows "into the
vanities of my own image, my own aesthetic production and sensitivies" (p.
85). He proposes a main Senex-Puer narrative instead of Oedipus-Antioedipus. Our
author, Schwartz, in turn touches, albeit inconsequentially, upon the alternative
Euripides' tale The Bacchae in his quotation of Agave and
Cadmus before the first chapter of his book (p. xvi), and the "paternal" vs. the "infantile" (p. 200) instead of the
otherwise recurrent "maternal". It is not clear where Hillman stands
in relations to Christianity and I do not endorse his particular relation to
Jung, but his references suggest that the Christian images of a Father-Son
relationship within a Trinity, merged with Spirit and a feminine image,
sacralized through the dogma of the Assumption, is the constructive conception
legitimized to the Christian mind by the Revelation. I see it as enabling a
therapy for the human psyche, resilient to the lures of PC which is a
particular psychological expression of neurosis, pathological narcissism, or
borderline syndrome dissimulated under the cover of the feminine. If not, as
Hillman expresses it (p. 98): "Of course we live in the age of Moms, for
the culture is secular and the ordinary mortal must carry archetypal loads
without help from the Gods. The mothers must support our survival without
support themselves, having to become Goddesses, everything too much, and they
sacrifice us to out frustrations as we in turn, becoming mothers and fathers,
sacrifice our children to the same civilization."
All this is aimed at advancing our reviewed book
towards an answer to real WHY of this supposedly Oedipal failure, to the
questions of AND SO WHAT - WHAT TO DO? An implicit answer to these questions
could be claimed to be the "Aha! Experience" of recognizing the
impact of the Oedipal explanation. But that does possibly work only for those
few who already are close to the insight. But what can we expect from naively
directing the PC-possessed to read books on psychoanalysis instead of
submitting themselves to it? The significant majority of those who are gripped
by the supposed anti-oedipality are definitionally not prone to be gripped by
the Aha! insight of the Oedipal narrative. If we cannot send half of the
Western world's possessed population to psychoanalysis by the other half would
it help to send them to church or, for that matter, say, to the synagogue or
the mosque? Or could we at least direct men to that sort of books of readings
and poems like the one Hillman himself with Robert Bly and others edited (The
Rag and Bone Shop of the Heart, 1992) to rescue at least American men from
PC? It should do also for Western women in general. Or should we recreate a
better sort of Eleusinian Mysteries (as studied by Edward A. Beach, 1995) as
they are related to the image of the Great Mother: An Analysis of the
Archetype, (Erich Neumann, 1955)? Or should we all be directed to the kind
of studies of the nature of love as exemplified by Amor and Psyche: The
Psychic Development of the Feminine (also by Erich Neumann, 1956, orig.
1952)?
I estimate that in all this the great merit of Society
Against Itself is to open the doors for the need, on one hand, of further
sheer "evangelization" and, on the other hand, further serious
research on human psyche and relations, beyond the very relevant group-dynamic
studies by Bion and Kernberg mentioned earlier. Examples were already suggested
above, of literature capable of multiplying the opportunities for Aha!
insights. Such literature if often remarkably absent and neglected in
PC-correct literature, gender studies, women studies, feministic theology, and
such. Further examples are the famous issue of violence against women which
recently has been heightened up to the level of United Nations and its area of
human rights, as if it were separated from the issue of violence against
civilians, children and old people in general. No mention is usually made in
that context of the nature and essence of violence to, say, Hannah Arendt's
classic On Violence (1969) or Rollo May's Power and
Innocence (1972) with its significant undertitle "A search for the sources
of violence". The words recall that Carl Jung, writes (in his Collected
Works CW 7, ¤78) that logically, the opposite of love is hate, and of Eros,
Phobos (fear); but psychologically it is the will to power. And there is much
rationalized talk about power and empowerment in feminist reinvindications. The
sources of violence and the references to these books tend to be ignored
because the issue has been moralistically downgraded to sheer moral
indignation on part of women, and now of the whole "society" including
business towards evil men, with repercussions in legislation and everywhere.
But how about violence against women, and about havoc in
organizations as portrayed by Schwartz having been bolstered by technology and
the breakdown of historically, painstakingly designed differential roles of
women and men, leading to the breakdown of the family as society's constitutive
unit, confrontational masculinization of women themselves, feminization of men,
divorces, consequent economic difficulties and quarrels about custody of
children and their education, etc.?
In general, the book's strenghts, consisting of
exemplifications in particular organizations, should be broadened to include
a
deeper and pragmatic understanding of ignored dimensions of gender differences
or supposed anti-oedipality. This has been done in the past and the insights
should be rescued for present and future applications. We have for
instance Lou Andreas-SalomŽ and her work on psychoanalysis, religion and
sex, grounded in her bindings to Freud, Nietzsche and Rilke, as analyzed in
Angela Livingstone's book on her life and writings (1984). Cf. SalomŽ's Der
Mensch als Weib (1899) or Die Erotik
(edited by Martin Buber, 1910). Approximately at the same time Carl Jung
was developing what came to be called analytical psychology after the schism
from Freud which is very significant for our purposes. This is portrayed in his
chapter on "Anima and Animus" in part 2 of the essay on "The
relations between the Ego and the Unconscious", in Two Essays on
Analytical Psychology (Collected Works vol. 7, 1966/1953). On this account
PC is mainly due to Animus-Anima obsession, rather than to anti-oedipality.
Before that, we had the most interesting and relevant Franz von Baader's "philosophy of love",
as Ernst Benz shows while digging in The
Mystical Sources of German Romantic Philosophy (1983). Jźrgen Habermas and
his modern continental philosophy has a close engagement with those currents
of
thoughts through Friedrich Schelling, showing the actuality of such presently
repressed mysticism. Baader, whose philosophy of love seems to be available in
the German collected works or in Italian translation (Filosofia Erotica,
1982), or edited in Ramon Betanzos' Franz von Baader's Philosophy of Love (1999),
offers interpretations of the gender issue which are radically different and
deeply ingrained in the history of natural science, philosophy, and theology.
They are also symptomatically totally ignored by present main currents of
feminism and social critique, as they also ignore the embarrassing "first
wave" of feminism, revived only in exclusive modern studies like Brian
Gibbons' Gender in Mystical and Occult Thought (1996). If there are
meaningful connections, as I suspect, with other "multi-myth" works
like Julius Evola's (his Metaphysics of
Sex, orig. 1991/1958, and Revolt against
the Modern World, orig. 1969) it only helps to understand the
roots of fascism which were buried in the perverse promiscuity and
intellectual-moral turbulence period between the two world wars. It prefigured
our present situation, resulting from the maturation of early misunderstanding
of the gender issue within the secularization process established at the time
of the French revolution. As a matter of fact, the origin of the perversion of
the gender issue which stands at the core of the PC-phenomenon is to be
searched at the dawning of reformed Enlightenment, as indicated by No‘lle Ch‰telet
in the foreword to Sade's classic, Justine (in Gallimard's French
edition, 1981). Ch‰telet shows how Sade's work assumes and spells out a
gender-philosophy. It is a philosophy that is conveniently ignored by most
politically correct gender studies since it fits almost perfectly both their
explicit and implicit philosophical grounds whenever such grounds can be
formulated at all, and are not sheer tragic disorientation as embodied by
destinies of feminist prominences such as, say, Andrea Dworkin. The
political point of view which also is extremely important in the PC-issue was
originally considered by Mitscherlich but his approach including a contemptuous
view of religion (p. 16, 188, 249) should be examined in its endorsement of the
so-called Critical Theory,
for its implications at the confluence of psychoanalysis, politics, and
theology. Mitscherlich gives there his problematic answer to the question which
Schwartz ignores: WHAT-TO-DO. Compare with the controversial but revealing
essay by Bill Lind about The Origins of
Political Correctness (2000). Ultimately I recommend the
political analysis in historical and modern terms by Tage Lindbom in his The
Myth of Democracy (1996), on a misunderstood democracy which has clear
consequences for the spreading of PC.
In other more controversial summarizing
words, to get the most out of this timely and extremely courageous book and its
valuable empirical content, and to avoid its pitfalls, try to bridge it back
to the problematic but all-encompassing Mitscherlich Mitscherlich, bridge
its
Freud plus the obscure Lacan over to Jung plus obscure Hillman. And bridge the
book's implicit use of the (Schwartzean Father's) rather naive Lockean,
positivistic, consensual, "democratic" view of external reality as
criticized in Churchman's The Design of Inquiring Systems (1971) to
non-Nietzschean post-Kantian philosophy, Hegel, Schelling, Baader, and further,
to the philosophy of technology, ending up in theology and religion. And, why
not have a meditative reading of the Bible's Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth)
and Apocalypse
(Revelation) which eventually indicate why the apparent hopelessness
of AND- SO-WHAT, WHAT-TO-DO lies beyond its reduction to oedipality vs.
anti-oedipality, to the point of it erroneously appearing as a failure of a
failed Messiah.
------
Final COMMENT:
I borrow a friend's words: The main problem with my
review is that it is much too long, and after the first thousand words or so,
does not say anything that most readers will understand. I'd cut it at around
the 1,000 word mark, doing what needed to be done within that limit to make
that into a whole, which is to say having a beginning, a middle, and an end.
That would work much better. For the rest, I think I'd be best off filling it
out as a long essay, in its own right, or even as a book. -- This
is what I thought and wished. But then I may have been right in "publishing" it as it is, considering that it takes a great
additional effort to improve it, perhaps greater than my writing up to now. It
was a matter of choosing between this, or nothing until further notice. It
takes genius to make complicated things simple (albeit not necessarily easy),
perhaps to the point of finding a Platonic or Copernican core or
"invariant" behind the complex and disordered. Maybe that was the
lure behind the book's author referring to the psychoanalytical Oedipal myth.
For the rest, in order to appreciate how infected
and prone to misunderstandings is the book's issue, requiring extensive and
space-consuming qualifications, please see the numerous slandering spam-reviews
of Warren Farrell's PC-critical bestseller The Myth of Male
Power (accessed up to 14 January 2011).
-------
NOTE
The publisher of the reviewed book is Karnac Books.
Compare this book with the author's earlier related
book The Revolt of the Primitive: An Inquiry into the Roots of Political
Correctness, (2003) summarized by reviews at amazon.com.
Accessed 31 Dec. 2010.